💣 The Fall of UMCC: A Strategic Collapse in Broad Daylight

While Ukraine fights on the frontlines, a different kind of battle unfolded in the rear — over assets, not trenches. Among the most shocking examples is the United Mining and Chemical Company (UMCC), a national titanium giant that was once capable of securing Ukraine’s independence from Russian raw materials.

Today, it’s no longer state-owned. And the price it was sold for? Laughably low. Here’s how it happened.

📉 The Profitability That Vanished

In 2015, UMCC posted a record profit margin of 66%. Just a few years later, it was sold after reporting a –24% loss. Coincidence? Hardly.

Every shift in leadership — both political and managerial — mirrors a corresponding dip in revenue efficiency. The more “reform” was declared, the more money quietly disappeared.

💸 The Timeline of Decline

The Timeline of Decline

🏆 Who Oversaw the Greatest Losses?

Using UMCC’s financial reports and comparing them to leadership changes, we estimated how much potential value was lost — based on a baseline profitability of 41% (the 2015–2016 average).

🥇 Dmytro Sennychenko (UMCC Chair, 2019–2021)

Estimated loss: ₴6.5 billion

He positioned UMCC for sale while the company reported near-zero profits. This phase saw:

• Massive outsourcing
• Shadow contractors
• Pre-auction “optimization” of losses

🥈 Vitalii Trubarov (Acting SPFU Chair, 2017–2018)

Estimated loss: ₴2.9 billion

A period of “stable decline.” Profit margins were artificially suppressed while revenue rose — a perfect environment for creating opaque expense flows.

🥉 Rustem Umerov (SPFU Chair, 2022–2023)

Estimated loss: ₴2.5 billion

Umerov didn’t build the scheme — he inherited it. But he oversaw its final act:

• Devaluation of UMCC
• Formal loss declarations
• Public rationale for “market-driven” sale

🧩 How the Scheme Worked

2016 — Entry of intermediaries: “consultants,” “repair services,” inflated outsourcing
2017–2019 — Phantom exporters, logistics padding, under-invoicing
2020–2021 — Normalized losses to prep for privatization
2022–2023 — Final devaluation & transfer to a “foreign investor”

⚖️ The Sale, the Buyer, the Damage

UMCC was sold to “Cemin Ukraine”, a company formally owned by Azerbaijan’s NEQSOL Group. But investigations suggest:

• Strong links to Russian titanium markets
• Political proximity to Eastern oligarchic circles
• Use of offshore structures to mask ownership

In essence, a strategic asset was offloaded at a discount — in the middle of a war for independence.

❌ What Reform Shouldn’t Look Like

Privatization is not a magic wand. It should never be used to launder failure or absolve corruption. In UMCC’s case, it functioned as:

• A tool of financial obfuscation
• A facade for asset extraction
• A method of public disinheritance

🔍 Summary Table: Losses by UMCC Chair

SPFU Head Term Estimated Loss (UAH) Dmytro Sennychenko 2019–2021 ₴6.5 billion Vitalii Trubarov 2017–2018 ₴2.9 billion Rustem Umerov 2022–2023 ₴2.5 billion Ihor Bilous (baseline) 2015–2016 — (66% profitability)

🧠 Conclusion: Not Mismanagement — Strategy

What happened to UMCC was not an accident. It was a coordinated erosion of value to facilitate a quiet sell-off. This is how post-Soviet economies are stripped: not by war, but by spreadsheet.

And the tragedy is — it was done in the name of progress.