Deal or Show? Can the Secret "Bayrak Deal" Bury the High-Profile "Sennichenko Case"?

Let us recall that we previously reported on schemes in which, according to the investigation, major state-owned enterprises of Ukraine were used to enrich a small circle of individuals. Now, we have in our hands an indictment and a court ruling concerning one of the case’s defendants—Serhiy Bayrak, who has agreed to a plea deal with justice.

This document is not just dry lines of legal text. It is almost a crime thriller script: secret meetings in luxurious restaurants, well-thought-out contract manipulations, millions draining from the state treasury, and, of course, an attempt to "buy off" real punishment by betting on cooperation with the investigation.

Defendants and Roles: Who’s Who in This Story

At the center of the plot is Dmytro Sennichenko, former head of Ukraine’s State Property Fund. According to the investigation, he gathered around him a group of "trusted" people who, through state-owned enterprises such as PJSC "OPZ" (Odesa Port Plant), orchestrated a scheme that caused multimillion-dollar losses to the country.

The main beneficiary of the scheme was the company "Agro Gas Trading", which obtained contracts for gas processing at OPZ.
Competition? Open tenders? Forget it. Everything was decided in a tight circle, and whenever more profitable offers appeared, they were simply "eliminated."

Serhiy Bayrak, the defendant at the center of our document, played the role of a middleman. His task was to coordinate connections between the right people, ensure the "correct" appointments to the OPZ Supervisory Board, and create conditions under which "Agro Gas Trading" continued to win contracts on terms less favorable for the state.

The result: UAH 554 million in losses for the state budget.

Plea Deal with Justice: Is Bayrak Giving Up the "Bosses"?

On November 18, 2024, the SAPO prosecutor and Bayrak concluded a deal (plea agreement).
Formally, everything was done by the book: he pleaded guilty, promised to cooperate with the investigation, and received the following sentence:

• 5 years of imprisonment with a fine of UAH 8,500

• Probation period – 1 year

• An obligation to return UAH 100,000 to the state as compensation for damages

That’s the dry version. In reality, the agreement looks quite strange, especially if you take a closer look at the case once again.

Essence of the Criminal Case

The criminal case № 52024000000000486 from 20.09.2024 (separated from an earlier case № 12020000000000236 from 11.03.2020) is being considered by the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine.

The accused, Serhiy Ihorovych Bayrak (hereinafter referred to as "the Accused"), was initially suspected of:

• Participation in a criminal organization (Part 2, Article 255 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine)

• Aiding and abetting abuse of office by officials of PJSC "OPZ" (Part 5, Article 27; Part 4, Article 28; Part 2, Article 364 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), which harmed the state’s interests.

Following the hearing (Court Ruling of 26.11.2024), the charge under Article 255 was dropped (he was released from liability under Part 6, Article 255), and the case continued only under Article 364.

The Charge of Abuse of Office (Article 364 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine)

The case concerns the alleged illegal extension and signing of contracts between PJSC "OPZ" and LLC "Agro Gas Trading" on terms less favorable than those offered by another bidder.

As a result, PJSC "OPZ" suffered damages totaling UAH 554,458,753.63 for the period from May 1, 2020, to October 31, 2021.

According to the investigation, the Accused, although not an official of OPZ, was a member of a criminal organization and facilitated the abuse of power, particularly by selecting and coordinating key individuals (representatives of the State Property Fund, OPZ management, etc.).

Final Legal Qualification of Bayrak’s Actions

• Part 5, Article 27 – Aiding and abetting

• Part 4, Article 28 – Acting as part of an organized group/criminal organization

• Part 2, Article 364 – Abuse of power, causing severe consequences

Plea Agreement (Plea Bargain)

The SAPO prosecutor and the Accused (with his defense attorney) signed a plea agreement on November 18, 2024, later modified (supplemented) on November 28, 2024.

The agreement was approved by the Head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (Deputy Prosecutor General).

Under the terms of the deal:

• Bayrak pleads guilty to the charges under Articles 27, 28, and 364.

• He agrees to cooperate with the investigation and provide truthful testimony against other defendants and in related cases.

• The punishment is agreed upon: 5 years of imprisonment with a 1-year probation period and a fine of UAH 8,500.

• He voluntarily compensates UAH 100,000 in damages to a special treasury account.

The court ultimately approved the agreement, recognizing it as compliant with the Criminal Procedure Code and "public interest."

Conclusions Regarding the Case Circumstances and the Role of Participants

The Accused (Bayrak S. I.)

He appeared as a middleman and coordinator of communication between the leadership of the State Property Fund and the involved individuals.
According to the indictment, he participated in a criminal organization but was released from liability under Article 255 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine based on Part 6, Article 255 (likely due to his cooperation with the investigation and assistance in uncovering the creation and operation of the criminal organization).

Key Officials

The case materials mention positions and individuals linked to the State Property Fund of Ukraine, PJSC "OPZ", as well as other participants whose actions, according to the investigation, harmed the interests of the state.
A crucial point – significant material damage (over UAH 550 million) was inflicted due to the conclusion of less favorable contracts and avoidance of open competitions.

The Role of LLC "Agro Gas Trading"

LLC "Agro Gas Trading" was the "preferred" contractor with whom contracts were extended and signed for the processing of gas into finished products at PJSC "OPZ".
According to the investigation, this enterprise was directly involved in the criminal collusion, as a result of which the processing prices were deliberately set higher than they could have been if another supplier had been chosen.

Public Legal Interest

The state, represented by PJSC "OPZ", suffered significant losses, which became the basis for qualification under Part 2, Article 364 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (abuse of power with grave consequences).
Given the involvement of the High Anti-Corruption Court, the case is considered important in the fight against corruption and economic crimes against state interests.

How Questionable is the Legality of the Plea Agreement?

Below are several aspects that may raise doubts or at least require further legal and fairness assessments.

1. Disproportion Between Punishment and the Severity of the Crime

According to the case materials, the damage caused by the criminal scheme exceeded UAH 550 million. However, the Accused, who played a key role in coordinating and selecting participants, ultimately:

• Was released from liability under Article 255 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (participation in an organized criminal group) based on Part 6, Article 255.

• Received a sentence of 5 years of imprisonment, with only 1 year of probation, for the remaining charge (Article 364 of the Criminal Code).

• Was fined UAH 8,500 and required to compensate only UAH 100,000, despite the total damage exceeding UAH 550 million.

At first glance, such a punishment may raise questions about the balance between public interest in combating corruption and the questionable benefits for the investigation resulting from this deal.

Legal Reference/Analogy:

According to Part 4, Article 469 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, a plea agreement is permissible in cases of serious and particularly serious corruption crimes, provided that the accused genuinely contributes to exposing other accomplices. Courts often consider that cooperation (identifying more significant figures) "compensates" for the mitigation of punishment.

The positions of the Cassation Criminal Court of the Supreme Court (KKS VS) and the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (Resolutions No. 13 of 23.12.2005 and No. 9 of 07.10.1994, with subsequent amendments) state that when applying Article 75 of the Criminal Code (conditional release), it is necessary to assess the totality of mitigating circumstances and the actual degree of the person’s involvement.

2. Lack of Explanation Regarding the Proportion of Damage Compensation

The text indicates that Bayrak S. I. is compensating only UAH 100,000, while the total damage caused amounts to UAH 554 million.
At the same time, it is claimed that the primary financial benefits may have been distributed among other participants.

This raises an open question:

• How will the remaining amount of damage be recovered?

• Could this result in a situation where the Accused, having fulfilled only minimal compensation, effectively avoids further financial liability?

3. "Voluntariness" and "Unconditional" Admission of Guilt, Possible Procedural Imbalance

The Criminal Procedure Code requires that a plea agreement be concluded voluntarily, without coercion. In the text of the ruling, the judge confirmed the absence of coercion. However, in similar cases, questions often arise as to whether the agreement was "forced" due to the threat of a more severe punishment.

In fact, the agreement was approved, and the court found no violations. However, in the future, the defense or other participants may challenge certain terms of the deal, especially if Bayrak S. I. testifies against them.

4. European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) Standards for "Plea Bargain" Procedures

The ECHR ruling in the case of "Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia" (No. 9043/05) confirms that plea agreements are compatible with the Convention, provided that they meet the following conditions:

• The accused voluntarily enters into the deal

• The accused understands their rights and waives the right to trial

• There is no violation of public interest

Applying these standards to the current case, it can be said that the court formally examined the voluntariness and free will of the Accused.
However, the question of whether the punishment is "sufficient" remains within the domain of national law and the discretion of national courts.

5. Impact on Further Investigation of Key Figures

The plea agreement was largely justified by the fact that Bayrak S. I. pledged to cooperate with the prosecution and provide incriminating testimony against other, more important "key" participants in the scheme.

The public interest in such a compromise lies in obtaining evidence against the organizers of the corruption mechanism that caused multimillion-dollar damages.

However, the success of such agreements depends on whether cooperation leads to real convictions of the individuals who, according to the investigation, derived the greatest financial benefit—or whether it simply becomes a "lifeline" for the Accused.
If the latter occurs, the "value" of the deal can be called into question.

General Conclusions on the Legality and Expediency of the Deal

Formal Compliance with the CPC

• The agreement was concluded in accordance with Articles 469-476 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (procedure for plea agreements).

• Approved by the head of SAPO, which meets the requirements of Part 2, Article 470 of the CPC for serious corruption offenses.

• The court verified the voluntariness and clarity of the agreement.

Question of Public Justice and Effectiveness

The punishment in the form of 5 years of imprisonment (conditionally) with a 1-year probationary period + a fine of UAH 8,500, despite damages amounting to UAH 554 million, raises doubts about proportionality to the scale of the crime.

Such mitigation of punishment may be justified (legally) only if the Accused indeed provides substantial evidence against the main organizers and beneficiaries.
If the Accused fails to provide such evidence, many questions will arise regarding other participants in the deal.

A similar practice of plea agreements exists in European jurisdictions; however, the key criterion is the real contribution of the accused to exposing higher-ranking or more significant accomplices.

Risks of Challenging the Legality of the Deal

• If it later turns out that Bayrak S. I. is not fulfilling the terms of the agreement, for example:

  • Fails to compensate for damages

  • Provides knowingly false testimony

  • Evades obligations
    Then the prosecutor may file a motion to annul the agreement under Article 476 of the CPC.

• If the Accused fulfills the agreement in good faith, it will likely remain valid; however, in public perception, it will continue to appear excessively "lenient" toward the Accused.

• It is crucial that Bayrak S. I.’s cooperation results in real outcomes—bringing "key" figures to justice. Otherwise, the deal loses its meaning as a mechanism for obtaining critical evidence.

• Although the victim formally agreed to the deal, any future civil claims (if filed against other defendants) should take into account the actual damage.
  It cannot be ruled out that part of the damages may be recovered from other individuals who derived greater financial benefits.

References to Judicial Precedents

• The Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, in its rulings (No. 13 of 23.12.2005, No. 7 of 03.06.2005, No. 15 of 04.06.2010, etc.), has repeatedly emphasized that the application of Article 75 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (release on probation) requires a thorough examination of all case circumstances.

• ECHR ("Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia", No. 9043/05) – Allows "plea deals" provided that voluntariness and the accused's rights are protected.

• If the Accused evades the agreement, immediate action should be taken to initiate procedures for revoking the sentence and resuming full prosecution under Article 364 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

Final Assessment

The SAPO deal with Bayrak is formally legal in terms of CPC (Articles 469-476) requirements, and it was likely approved by the High Anti-Corruption Court considering his "cooperation with the investigation."

The questionable side of the deal is the obvious "imbalance" between the severity of the crime (which caused multimillion-dollar losses) and the extremely lenient punishment, as well as the insignificant amount of voluntary compensation.
The fairness of such a compromise can only be considered justified if Bayrak’s testimony is truly valuable and helps bring the main organizers to justice, from whom the major portion of the damages can be recovered.

The precedent-setting nature (in the context of Ukraine) lies in the fact that similar deals with defendants in "corruption" cases (especially when large financial losses are involved) always seem highly questionable and raise serious concerns regarding public justice.
Nevertheless, the CPC allows for such a mechanism, guided by the principle of greater benefit for the investigation and the exposure of large-scale corruption schemes.

What’s Next?

For the ordinary citizen, all of this looks like a mockery of justice.
The total damage in the case amounts to UAH 554,458,753.63, yet the main figure at this stage of the investigation will pay only UAH 100,000 and get away with a probation period. Is this justice?

However, the prosecutor’s office tries to convince the public otherwise:
Bayrak did not just get away with a light sentence—he made a deal, which means he must hand over bigger players.
The real question is:

• How valuable is his information?

• Who decided that it is "valuable" in the first place?

• Will his testimony actually send the real "bosses" behind bars, or are we witnessing just another convenient "way out" for a defendant who managed to negotiate his way out of serious punishment?

And the main question remains:
Will this deal lead to a real breakthrough in the "Sennichenko Case" investigation, or will it become just another example of how corruption in Ukraine successfully adapts to any reforms?

In the coming months, one of two scenarios will unfold:

1. Bayrak will provide truly valuable testimony, leading law enforcement to new key figures, and the investigation will gain momentum.

2. The case will sink into bureaucratic stagnation, and his deal will be remembered only as another episode of "controlled justice," which will soon be forgotten.

Right now, the fate of the case hangs in the balance.
It will either become the first step in exposing one of the largest corruption schemes of recent years,
or just another act in the performance called "the fight against corruption,"
where the real victims—Ukrainian citizens—once again remain mere silent witnesses to the triumph of corruption.

The editorial team will continue to monitor developments.