The Economic Logic of Neocolonial Exploitation: Why the “Collective West” Has No Interest in Conquering Russian Territory

Theoretical Foundations: Giovanni Arrighi’s Concept

Capitalist Cycles and Territorial Expansion

In his seminal work “The Long Twentieth Century,” Giovanni Arrighi demonstrates the key difference between capitalist and territorialist states. The most successful capitalist states — medieval Venice and Genoa — achieved enormous wealth precisely by refusing territorial expansion in favor of trade networks and financial control.

The Economic Logic of Refusing Conquest

Arrighi shows that capitalist states systematically avoid direct territorial conquest due to the economic inefficiency of such an approach. Historical experience demonstrates that territorial conquest leads to the necessity of:

1. Massive investments in infrastructure
2. Creating efficient administration
3. Constant costs of maintaining occupied territories
4. Social development of the controlled population

Why the West Doesn’t Conquer Russia: Economic Reasons

The Problem of “Civilized Exploitation”

European experience shows that any Western capital, having gained control over territory, begins to “put it in order” — building a semblance of their own country there. This means:

• Creating legal institutions and fighting corruption
• Investments in education and healthcare
• Developing transport infrastructure
• Implementing environmental standards
• Ensuring social guarantees

All this requires colossal capital investments that make territorial exploitation unprofitable.

The Dutch Experience: Lessons from the West India Company

The historical example of the Dutch West India Company vividly demonstrates the economic inefficiency of direct control. The Dutch initially captured territories in South America but quickly abandoned this model, realizing its unprofitability. The costs of “civilized” territorial management exceeded the profits from their exploitation.

Advantages of “Barbaric” Exploitation

Instead, the model of indirect control through corrupt local regimes ensures:

1. Minimal costs: only need to support a small group of loyal corrupt officials
2. Cheap resources: ability to buy raw materials at prices significantly below market rates
3. No obligations: no need to invest in territorial development
4. Political irresponsibility: all internal problems are the affair of local authorities

Modern Russia as an Ideal Model for Exploitation

The modern Russian system presents an ideal model for indirect exploitation:

• Authoritarian regime capable of suppressing any resistance
• Corrupt elite ready to sell national resources for personal gain
• Absence of legal institutions allowing dictation of terms
• Raw material economy with minimal processing
• Suppressed civil society unable to resist

The British Model: Non-Interference Policy

Evolution of Colonial Policy

The British Empire evolved from direct colonial administration to a non-interference policy that proved significantly more effective. The essence of this model:

• Minimal interference in internal affairs
• Cooperation with local despots instead of creating civilized administration
• Economic control through trade agreements and financial mechanisms
• Support for authoritarian regimes capable of ensuring supply stability

Economic Efficiency of Despotism

Paradoxically, supporting despotic regimes proves economically more profitable than building democratic institutions. Despotism ensures:

• Low resource prices through suppression of local population
• Supply stability by crushing any resistance
• Absence of environmental and social standards
• Minimal costs of regime maintenance

Modern Examples: Why Military Interventions Are Unprofitable

The Experience of Iraq and Afghanistan

American military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly demonstrated the economic inefficiency of direct control:

1. Enormous military costs: trillions of dollars on military operations
2. Need for infrastructure development: billions on rebuilding the destroyed
3. Constant population resistance: additional security costs
4. Political risks: loss of international authority

Effectiveness of Sanctions Regimes

Instead, sanctions regimes and economic pressure prove significantly more effective:

• Low costs compared to military operations
• Political legitimacy in the eyes of the international community
• Possibility of gradual pressure escalation
• Stimulation of internal conflicts in authoritarian regimes

Why the Myth of “Western Threat” is Maintained

Functions of the Myth for the Authoritarian Regime

The myth of a conquest threat from the West serves several important functions for the Russian regime:

1. Population mobilization around the government through the image of an external enemy
2. Justification of repressions and limitation of civil liberties
3. Explanation of economic problems by external factors instead of internal corruption
4. Legitimization of military spending and aggressive foreign policy

Benefits for the Corrupt Elite

Maintaining this myth is also beneficial for the Russian corrupt elite:

• Justification of capital transfers to the West as “protective measures”
• Preservation of resource monopoly under the guise of “national security”
• Suppression of opposition as “Western agents”

Imperial Theater as a Tool of Exploitation

Function of Imperial Myths in the Colonial System

All imperial rhetoric about “greatness,” “historical mission,” and “special path” is nothing more than theater that serves a specific economic function — helping local exploiters more effectively rob their own population. Imperial symbols, military parades, and aggressive rhetoric create an illusion of power and significance behind which lies banal resource plundering.

Mechanisms of Psychological Influence

Imperial mythology operates through several psychological mechanisms:

1. Compensation for real problems: instead of improving people’s lives, they are offered “pride in the state”
2. Redirecting anger: dissatisfaction with living conditions is directed at external “enemies”
3. Illusion of involvement: ordinary citizens feel part of a “great state” while actually being mere victims of exploitation
4. Justification of sacrifices: suffering is explained not by elite corruption but by “struggle for empire”

Economic Function of Imperial Ideology

Behind pompous imperial rhetoric lies prosaic economic logic:

• Budget militarization allows redistribution of funds in favor of elite-connected companies
• Isolationism reduces domestic market competition, allowing high prices to be maintained
• Repressive apparatus protects the corrupt system from internal resistance
• Propaganda machine distracts attention from actual resource plundering

Historical Parallels

Similar mechanisms were used in all colonial systems:

• British “civilizing mission” justified the plundering of India
• French “cultural mission” covered exploitation of African colonies
• Belgian “Christianization” of Congo was accompanied by genocide for rubber
• Soviet “world revolution” masked exploitation of republics for the benefit of the Russian center

Complicity of the Exploited Population

The most cynical aspect of this system is that the exploited population not only tolerates the plundering but actively supports it, buying into imperial propaganda. Russian peasants living without gas and sewerage are ready to support wars “for the glory of the empire” that robs them.

Role of External “Enemies” in the System

External “enemies” are a necessary element of the system because they:

• Justify low living standards as temporary sacrifices
• Explain economic problems by external factors
• Mobilize support for authorities as “national defenders”
• Justify repressions against internal opposition

Tellingly, when external enemies are lacking, they are actively invented or provoked into aggressive actions.

The Ukrainian Case: Preservation of the Colonial Model

It is revealing that in Ukraine, as a recent colony of Moscow, an analogous colonial management scheme has generally been preserved with the sole difference that money is withdrawn from Ukraine by other financial-industrial groups. After 1991, Ukrainian oligarchs simply replaced the Soviet nomenclature in the role of local exploiters who:

• Preserved the raw material orientation of the economy
• Continued capital export to Western financial centers
• Maintained a corrupt management system
• Blocked technological development in favor of short-term profits

This model suits Western capital just as much as the Russian one, as it provides cheap raw materials without the need to invest in territorial development.

Conclusions

Economic analysis clearly demonstrates that the “collective West” has no interest whatsoever in conquering Russian territory, as this would be economically disadvantageous. The modern model of indirect control through corrupt local elites provides significantly higher profitability with minimal costs and risks.

The myth of “Western threat” is maintained by the Russian regime exclusively for domestic political reasons — to mobilize the population and justify repressive policies. In reality, the West is interested in preserving precisely such a regime in Russia that ensures uninterrupted supplies of cheap resources without the need to bear responsibility for the country’s internal problems.

An analogous situation has developed in Ukraine, where after changing the political system, the basic principles of colonial exploitation have been preserved, only with new beneficiaries in the form of local financial-industrial groups.

References

1. Arrighi, G. (1994). The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times. London: Verso.
2. Wallerstein, I. (1974). The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press.
3. Harvey, D. (2003). The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Ferguson, N. (2004). Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. London: Penguin Press.
5. Stiglitz, J. (2006). Making Globalization Work. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.