A study of the Byzantine, Western European, and Russian imperial traditions yields nine indispensable criteria of legitimate imperial authority — a “Formula of Nine.” This is not an arbitrary checklist. It is a millennium of political experience distilled into a diagnostic instrument, in which every element carries its own weight, and the absence of even one converts legitimate power into usurpation.
Before We Start Counting: Two Rus’ as Two Romes
Before turning to the criteria themselves, we need to fix a structural pattern that repeated itself twice in history — and both times with the same logic of forgery.
When Constantinople declared itself the “New Rome” and renamed the empire Roman (Romaioi), the original Rome had not disappeared. It existed, it had its bishop, its tradition, its claim to primacy. The “fall of Rome” was a narrative constructed in the interests of a new power center — not a historical fact in the sense commonly assumed. The Western Roman Empire ceased to exist as a political structure, but Rome as a sacred and civilizational center kept functioning. Calling it “the First Rome that has fallen” was an act of ideological clearance — making room for one’s own primacy.
Moscow reproduced this operation literally — but applied it to Rus’. When the monk Philotheus of Pskov constructed the doctrine of the “Third Rome” in the early sixteenth century, he was not relying solely on the fall of Constantinople in 1453. He was simultaneously building a second fiction: that Kyiv had “fallen,” that Rus’ had “migrated” northward, and that Moscow had become its legitimate heir and new center. Yet Kyiv — the original Rus’ — had no more disappeared than Rome had disappeared under Constantinople. It continued to exist, it preserved the metropolitan see, it preserved historical memory and legal continuity. “Rus’” did not relocate to Moscow. Moscow appropriated the name — exactly as Constantinople had appropriated the name of Rome.
This is not coincidence. It is a template. The political simulacrum reproduces the same technology every time: declare the predecessor dead, occupy its place, inherit its legitimacy — while possessing no actual right to any of it.
East and West: Two Answers to One Question
Before examining the nine criteria, it is essential to register a fundamental difference between the two great imperial traditions — Eastern and Western — because it determines how each criterion actually applies.
In the Eastern, Byzantine tradition, the emperor stands above the church — or more precisely, stands alongside it, but above the patriarch in the hierarchy of earthly institutions. This did not mean arbitrary power: the concept of symphonia imposed genuine obligations on the emperor. But it was he who convened councils, appointed patriarchs, and determined the boundaries of their jurisdictions. The church was part of the body of the state, not a separate sovereign authority.
In the Western tradition, the situation is precisely the reverse: the pope stands above the emperor. It was the pope who crowned Charlemagne in 800 — and that act was not a ceremony, it was a political statement: power flows from God through Rome, not through the sword or bloodline. The entire history of the medieval West is the history of the investiture struggle — the contest over who appoints whom. The tension between papacy and empire generated the political pluralism that defines Western civilization to this day.
Moscow inherited the Eastern model — but applied it with a radicalism Byzantium never permitted itself. Peter I abolished the patriarchate and created the Holy Synod — a state department for managing the church. That was the end of symphonia even in its formal sense. And yet Moscow’s ideology continued to present the tsar as “protector of the Orthodox Church” — preserving the rhetoric of the Eastern tradition while gutting its institutional content.
One further point deserves attention: the tsarist title in Muscovy did not originate as the designation of a Moscow monarch. It originated as the title of the protector of the Rus’ Church — in precisely that capacity that Ivan IV accepted coronation in 1547. The claim was not territorial but sacral: not “I rule this land,” but “I protect this faith.” This makes the subsequent subordination of the church to the state not merely a political decision, but a foundational contradiction at the very heart of Moscow’s imperial identity.
The Nine Criteria
1. Defender of the Faith (Defensor fidei). The emperor is not merely a secular ruler. His power is legitimate only insofar as he has accepted responsibility for the spiritual condition of his subjects. Constantine the Great, whom Eusebius of Caesarea called “the divinely appointed defender of the faith,” established this principle as the foundation: Imperium without Religio has no meaning. Justinian I encoded it in law, fought heresies personally, wrote theological treatises, convened councils. This was not political staging — it was a condition of power’s existence.
Legitimate: one who bears genuine responsibility for orthodoxy, not merely displays a cross for the cameras.
Illegitimate: one who uses the church as an instrument of legitimation while accepting no real obligations to defend the faith — and who, when political necessity demands, is prepared to sacrifice the church itself.
2. Symphonia (Symphonia). Justinian’s concept, enshrined in his Sixth Novella: “There are two great gifts which God, in His love for man, has granted from on high… the priesthood and the imperial dignity… both proceed from the same source.” The essence is not the subordination of church to state nor state to church, but a harmonious interaction in which neither absorbs the other. The patriarch retains the real ability to refuse coronation of a candidate he does not approve. This is not decoration — it is constitutional principle.
In the Eastern tradition, symphonia was the tension between two genuine powers. In the Western tradition, that tension became open conflict, generating political competition. In the Moscow tradition, symphonia was proclaimed and then practically abolished: first de facto, through the subjugation of the church under Ivan the Terrible; then de jure under Peter I.
Legitimate: one under whom the church retains the real capacity to say no.
Illegitimate: one who has converted the church into a department of ideology — when the patriarch blesses a war on government request, that is not symphonia, it is occupation.
3. Dynastic Continuity (Dynastia). Legitimate power is transmitted, not seized. Roman law distinguished between universal succession — in which the heir accepts not only privileges but obligations of the predecessor — and succession through usurpation, which carries no obligations whatsoever. The Rurikids built a system in which, by the fifteenth century, “the only legitimate all-Russian rulers, from the standpoint of dynastic patrimonial law, were the grand princes of Moscow and Vladimir.” This was not self-proclamation — it was the recognition of dynasty as a legal construction.
Legitimate: one who stands in an unbroken chain of transmission.
Illegitimate: one who arrived through a coup, palace conspiracy, or forcible seizure, and subsequently constructed a “historical continuity” in hindsight.
4. Patriarchal Coronation (Coronatio). The patriarchal coronation is not a ceremony. It is a legal act. A tradition dating from 450 AD, when Patriarch Anatolius crowned Emperor Marcian, had by the seventh century become a necessary condition of full legitimacy: “The first emperor to be crowned in a church was Phocas in 602.” It was the patriarch who pronounced the words: “This visible adornment of your head is the eloquent symbol that you are invisibly crowned by the King of Kings, Christ.” Without this act, power was power de facto — but not de jure.
In the Eastern tradition, the patriarch crowns as God’s representative — but within the emperor’s supremacy. In the Western tradition, the pope crowns as the highest earthly authority over the emperor. The difference is foundational: who serves whom, and who legitimizes whom.
Legitimate: one recognized by the church through the established rite.
Illegitimate: one who either bypassed the rite or performed it under conditions in which the church had no freedom to say no.
5. Messianic Mission (Missio). Empire always claimed something beyond territorial administration. Its legitimacy fed from a source of higher calling: Pax Romana, the universal Christian kingdom, the Third Rome. Philotheus of Pskov’s formula — “two Romes have fallen, the third stands, and there shall be no fourth” — was not a Moscow invention: it expressed the logic the entire Orthodox political theology had been building since 1453. But it is precisely here that the Moscow tradition most visibly reproduced the technology of the Constantinople simulacrum: as the New Rome declared the living Rome “fallen,” Moscow declared the existing Kyiv a “fallen” Rus’.
A mission must be alive — meaning it must genuinely direct policy, not serve as decoration upon it.
Legitimate: one whose domestic and foreign policy is actually defined by the proclaimed mission.
Illegitimate: one who deploys the messianic narrative as expansionist justification — when “the protection of Orthodoxy” means the annexation of a neighboring sovereign state’s territory, that is not a mission, it is a crime dressed in theology.
6. Noble Ancestry (Genealogia). Genealogy in imperial law is not merely family history. It is a legal argument. In medieval society, “genealogy could become legally, as well as politically, important.” Even William the Conqueror — a man who won by force of arms — did not invoke the right of the strong. He insisted he was the lawful heir of Edward the Confessor. When Metropolitan Spiridon in the early sixteenth century traced the Rurikid lineage back to a relative of Emperor Augustus, this was an ideological construction, not a historical fact. But the construction worked — because it appealed to a logic no one contested: power must have a pedigree.
Legitimate: one whose origin genuinely traces back to a recognized line of authority.
Illegitimate: one who fabricated a lineage after the fact to fill a vacuum of succession.
7. Legal Foundation (Jus imperii). Power must exist within the legal order, not above it. The Roman tradition produced the concept of the emperor as nomos empsychos — the “living law.” This meant: source of law and its first subject simultaneously. Weber identified three types of legitimate authority — rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic. Imperial power in its classical understanding combined all three. The gap between the law a ruler issues and the law he himself obeys is the diagnostic sign of illegitimacy.
Legitimate: one who accepts normative constraints upon his own power.
Illegitimate: one for whom law is an instrument for governing others, but not himself.
8. Ritual Power (Ritus). Imperial regalia — crown, scepter, orb — are not ornaments. They are, as the tradition precisely formulates it, “legal instruments of the transfer of power.” But with a crucial qualification: “it is not the objects themselves that confirm the authority of the throne; rather, it is the unbroken line of succession they symbolize.” The Monomakh’s Cap, which crowned Russian tsars, was of local manufacture and had no direct connection to Constantinople — which did not prevent it from being deployed as a symbol of continuity with Byzantium. This distinction — between genuine symbolic succession and its imitation — is fundamental.
Legitimate: one who received the regalia through an unbroken chain of succession.
Illegitimate: one who manufactured the symbols and proclaimed himself heir to a tradition he himself had severed.
9. Canon Law (Jus canonicum). The final element of the system: the normative framework governing relations between church and state. Justinian did not merely cooperate with the church — he codified that cooperation in the Code and Novellae, which contained detailed norms on the election of bishops, the administration of church property, monastic life. Canon law existed as a constraint on both parties — church and state alike. The moment either side annuls that constraint, symphonia becomes a monologue.
Legitimate: one who operates within canon law, not above it.
Illegitimate: one who abolished the patriarchate, replaced it with a state synod, and centuries later “restored the patriarchate” — but as an instrument, not an institution.
Conclusion: One Pattern, Two Incarnations
The “Formula of Nine” is not a historical artifact. It is a diagnostic tool. But before applying it to specific regimes, one structural conclusion demands to be stated plainly.
History offers two great simulacra of imperial succession — and both operate by the same logic.
Constantinople declared itself the New Rome, called Rome “fallen,” and appropriated its legacy. Rome continued to exist — with the pope, with the tradition, with the claim to primacy. The “fall” was an ideological construction, necessary to clear the space.
Moscow declared itself the heir of Rus’, called Kyiv “overthrown,” and appropriated its name and history. Kyiv continued to exist — with the metropolitanate, with the memory, with the right of primogeniture. The “fall” of Rus’ was the same ideological construction — reproduced six centuries later.
A regime that violates half of the nine criteria is no longer an empire in any legitimate sense. It is power that has preserved the symbolism of a tradition while gutting its content. A church without freedom, a genealogy without history, a mission without ethics, law without constraint on power — these are all details of the same portrait.
And the portrait is well known.
You can read more about this and much else in my book The Russian Myth. The first volume of the trilogy “Myths of the Third Rome” is also currently in its final edit — stay tuned for the announcement!
