Why Ukrainian Political Parties Resemble Franchises
"Selling Licenses for Participation":
Electoral list spots that guarantee parliamentary seats are often sold for significant sums. This practice is akin to purchasing a "license" to use the party brand for advancing personal or group interests.
Contractual Nature of Decisions:
Most laws, votes, and appointments are based on behind-the-scenes agreements involving financial-industrial groups (FIGs). This resembles a "royalty" model, where the "franchisee" makes payments in exchange for political backing.
Ties to Oligarchic Groups:
Ukrainian political parties are typically tools of FIGs, which fund their operations and dictate their agendas. The party serves as a representative of FIG interests in parliament or the government.
Trading in State Interests:
MPs and party leaders use their mandates to lobby for the interests of their sponsors. This mirrors how "franchisees" adapt global standards to local markets but, in this case, to serve specific FIG interests.
Corruption as a Business Model:
Voting on laws, distributing government positions, and allocating budgetary funds are often done for financial gain. This can be compared to "contributions" paid to maintain a position in the system.
Why It's Not Exactly a Franchise
Lack of Long-Term Strategy:
Franchises rely on stable business models, while many Ukrainian parties focus on short-term gains. Many disappear after one or two election cycles.
Weak Institutional Structure:
Franchises involve centralized standards and strict control. Ukrainian parties often lack such discipline, with regional branches acting independently.
Personalized Nature:
Most Ukrainian parties are tied to specific FIGs rather than ideologies or consistent principles. This dependence on a single leader's vision makes them fragile.
Unpredictability:
Franchises are built on stability and trust in the brand. Ukrainian parties, however, often associate their "brand" with corruption, undermining voter confidence.
Conclusion:
Ukrainian political parties indeed exhibit many features of franchises: selling electoral spots, oligarchic funding, and trading influence and votes. However, their lack of long-term strategy, weak structures, and reliance on leaders make them more like temporary political projects than true franchises.
In a classic franchise, trust in the brand is the key asset. In Ukrainian parties, the brand is often used solely as a tool for profit, transforming them into commercialized entities with low public trust.