In official materials and the media, Putin has been shown in a variety of heroic roles: as an Orthodox defender, as a judo athlete, as a fearless commander, and as a friend of animals. Demonstrative episodes (diving for ancient amphorae, flying with cranes, horseback riding, extinguishing fires, etc.) were actively disseminated, although later some of them turned out to be staged.

Nevertheless, propagandists referred to Putin as “by the grace of God” and “the helmsman,” literally equating him to a kind of state shrine. Such glorification directly refers to classic personality cults of the Soviet era — the image of the “father of the nation” — although officially the authorities deny the existence of a Putin cult. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has repeatedly claimed that the president himself “does not like this,” and has cited as an example that naming streets or objects after him is supposedly rare, “atypical” (for example, in Chechnya, where there is a Putin Avenue and plans for a judo palace in his name). In practice, however, it is the Kremlin that initiates or encourages events intended to sacralize Putin’s figure and reinforce emotional attachment to him in the mass consciousness.

One such direction of this PR has become the emphasis on the genealogy and family of the president. In 2024, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), a stand appeared from the House of Family Traditions “Christian”, where the genealogy of Vladimir Putin was presented. Researchers, commissioned by a certain Alexander — a distant cousin of Putin — spent nearly a year assembling the family tree of the head of state, tracing his peasant roots back to pre-revolutionary times. This exposition effectively introduced the president’s genealogy into the public space, demonstrating the “deep roots” of the Putin family and likely intended to connect the leader’s image with Russia’s historical legacy.

A logical continuation of such familial sacralization became the exhibition of wartime relics of the president’s father at the next economic forum. On June 18, 2025, the media reported that at SPIEF-2025, the personal wartime awards of Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin — the father of the head of state — would be displayed. The exhibition was again organized at the stand of the House of Family Traditions “Christian” in St. Petersburg. Forum visitors are shown medals, an award sheet, and the order of decoration of Vladimir Spiridonovich, received by him during the Great Patriotic War. Thus, the family history of Putin is presented as part of the national memory of the war, even being integrated into the program of the economic forum (notably, SPIEF-2025 is thematically dedicated to the 80th anniversary of Victory, whose symbols are present at the stands).

Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin’s Military Path and His Awards

Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin (1911–1999) was indeed a participant in the Great Patriotic War. According to archival data, from June 1941, he fought as part of the 330th Rifle Regiment of the 86th Division of the Red Army, defending the Nevsky Pyatachok bridgehead near Leningrad. On November 17, 1941, Putin Sr. received a severe shrapnel wound (to the leg and foot) at Nevsky Pyatachok, after which, apparently, he left the front line. For the courage shown and the completion of combat tasks, he was nominated for an award. In 1942, the commander of the Leningrad Front, Marshal Leonid Govorov, signed an order awarding the Red Army soldier Vladimir Putin the Medal “For Military Merit”. According to sources, this medal was awarded specifically for participation in the battle at Nevsky Pyatachok. Thus, Vladimir Spiridonovich was recognized with a combat award for his personal participation in one of the fiercest battles near Leningrad.

In addition, it is known that the president’s father had other medals from the wartime period. According to open sources, he was also awarded the Medal “For the Defense of Leningrad” (given to all defenders of the besieged city) and the Medal “For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945”. In the postwar years, Vladimir Putin Sr. worked as a foreman at a factory in Leningrad, joined the Communist Party (VKP(b)) as early as 1941, and raised his family. In 1985, for the 40th anniversary of Victory, like many veterans, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class — this award was established by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR specifically for the anniversary, as a sign of recognition to all living veterans. Thus, the widely known “set” of Vladimir Spiridonovich’s awards, which appeared in earlier biographical articles, included three military medals and one order (from 1985). For a long time, no other distinctions of the president’s father were reported publicly.

11 Medals: Where Did the Additional Ones Come From?

The latest exhibition at SPIEF surprised many: it was reported that the stand displayed a total of 11 medals of Vladimir Spiridonovich plus the Order of the Patriotic War. This is nearly three times more than the previously mentioned 3 wartime medals. The natural question arises — what exactly are these additional medals, and “where did they come from”?

A likely explanation is that, in addition to the main combat awards, the exhibition includes all commemorative and anniversary medals awarded to Putin Sr. in the following decades as a war veteran. In the USSR, every war participant was presented with special anniversary medals on round dates of Victory. For example, in 1965 — the medal “20 Years of Victory”, in 1975 — “30 Years of Victory”, in 1985 — “40 Years of Victory”, and in 1995 already in the Russian Federation — “50 Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War”. It is likely that Vladimir Spiridonovich received at least some of these anniversary decorations, as he lived to see the respective dates.

In addition, veterans of the Siege of Leningrad were awarded separate insignia, and after the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, new Russian Federation awards appeared for front-line soldiers (in particular, the Marshal Zhukov Medal, established in 1994, awarded to living war participants). Finally, it is possible that Putin Sr. had the Soviet Medal “For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945” (if he was recognized as a home-front worker, although it is known that during the blockade he fought, and his wife worked at a factory), or the “Veteran of Labor” medal for long postwar work service.

Thus, if we gather all the possible awards of a front-line soldier — both combat and commemorative — their total number can indeed reach ten or more. According to the RIA report, the organizers are showing not only the medals themselves, but also accompanying documents — the award sheet and order of decoration from 1942, which gives the exhibition the character not just of a display case with decorations, but of a kind of historical archive. It is likely that these documents and the full set of awards were discovered and systematized during last year’s genealogical research of the Putin family or were provided by relatives. Such detailed information about the awards of the president’s father had not previously been available in open sources, so the display of 11 medals came as news to the public. In effect, there is a “reassembly” of Vladimir Spiridonovich’s image as a full bearer of all the honors due to a front-line soldier, a hero and participant in the great Victory — which, in turn, strengthens the aura of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin as the heir of the victorious generation.

Reaction and Parallels: from “Putinomics” to the Kadyrov Example

Critically-minded observers received this situation with a fair amount of irony. On social media and in independent commentary, there appeared the opinion that Kremlin propaganda is engaged in “creating a myth about Putin” to such an extent that it even posthumously multiplies the merits of his father. Sarcastically, this was called the “discovery of Putinomics” — they say, there were four medals, now there are eleven, “at this rate, he’ll soon compete with Adam Kadyrov”. The reference here is to the son of Chechen head Ramzan Kadyrov — 17-year-old Adam Kadyrov, who over the past year has received a whole scattering of high awards and titles, essentially thanks to his father. Indeed, by the age of majority, Adam was already listed as a Hero of the Chechen Republic, a bearer of the orders of Kadyrov, “For Services to Kabardino-Balkaria”, “For Services to Karachay-Cherkessia”, the Order of “Labor Valor of Russia”, a number of religious and departmental honors, and even the keeper of a historic order of the Shamil Imamate. In total, over 2023–24, teenager Kadyrov was awarded more than ten orders and medals — largely in advance and at the will of his influential parent. This absurd situation is compared by journalists and commentators to the sudden increase in the number of medals of Putin Sr., hinting that we are also dealing here with a politically motivated “beautification” of a biography.

Of course, formally all the medals shown belonging to Putin’s father are real historical decorations, not newly issued — but the very decision to exhibit them right now, in the midst of the current propaganda agenda, is interpreted by critics as another step in constructing a “cult of the ancestors” under the current leader.

At the same time, the official media continue to emphasize the significance of this action. State-run outlets present the story as a tribute to the generation of victors and to the president’s family. Reports highlight that “almost every stand at SPIEF features the logo of the 80th anniversary of Victory,” within which the exhibition of Putin’s father’s awards appears as a natural and patriotic initiative. Thus, for supporters of the government, the display of family relics is intended to strengthen the emotional connection between the people and the figure of the president through national pride in the Victory.

Why Does the Kremlin Need the Sacralization of the Image?

The exhibition of Vladimir Spiridonovich’s awards is not just a one-off episode but part of a broad strategy for the sacralization of Putin’s power. By linking the current president’s image to the heroic wartime generation, Kremlin ideology creates a narrative of succession: “Putin is the son of a front-line soldier, the heir of the victorious people.” In modern Russia, the victory in 1945 and the memory of the war have in fact acquired sacred status, becoming a central element of state ideology. Integrating Putin into this sacred context (through his family history), the authorities attempt to elevate his legitimacy to the level of “historical inevitability” or even “holiness” in the eyes of citizens. As researchers have noted, in post-Crimean Russia, Putin’s image increasingly merges with the image of the state, and the glorious pages of the past (Victory, Soviet achievements) are used to justify current policy and consolidate society around the leader. The sacralization of the past leads to the rehabilitation of past cults, and parallels with Stalin are sometimes drawn intentionally.

In other words, the cult of Vladimir Putin’s personality is being constructed on several levels. On one hand, he is credited with outstanding personal qualities and pseudo-heroic episodes (sports, extreme hobbies, wise leadership). On the other hand, his roots, family, connection to the heroic generation, and traditional values are emphasized. This second — “family-historical” — component is relatively new but is being increasingly exploited by the authorities. The presentation of the president’s genealogy at the economic forum, and then the wartime awards of his father, appears precisely as a PR campaign for sacralization, brought to a symbolic maximum. It is practically a deification not only of the leader himself but of his lineage.

Such actions reinforce the cult in the minds of those they target: the patriotically inclined part of society, for whom the image of “Putin the Victor” and “Putin the heir of the victors” must become unquestionable. Officially, no “cult of personality” is acknowledged (and Putin himself publicly dismisses overly explicit manifestations, such as renaming public objects in his honor). However, the facts say otherwise: portraits of Putin multiply across the country, as do quotes, commemorative sites, poems, songs, and officials competing in vows of loyalty — all of which are characteristic features of an emerging cult.

The exhibition of orders and medals is part of this mosaic. By including Putin’s image in the sacred narrative of the Great Victory, the authorities seek to confer upon him not just political authority, but a kind of “higher” justification. In the public consciousness, the idea is cultivated that the current leader is the direct heir of great heroes and therefore infallible. Such sacralization of power, according to independent experts, leads to the primitivization of thought and the loss of critical perception: in the eyes of the people, a sacred leader stands above ordinary criteria of judgment. That, it seems, is precisely what the Kremlin is striving for, constructing Putin as a mythological figure. Thus, the story of the “11 medals of Putin’s father” serves both current propaganda and the legend of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin for future generations — a legend in which family merit and personal cult are tightly interwoven.