The Russo-Ukrainian war of 2014–2024 has exposed not only the imperial ambitions of the Kremlin, but also the fundamental nature of the armed forces of the Russian Federation as a punitive instrument. Unlike the militaries of other states, designed for defense and structured around deterrence and strategic balance, the Russian army is structurally and functionally tailored for suppressing uprisings, repressing populations, conducting deportations, and spreading terror. Throughout its history, Russia’s military doctrine has preserved a colonial character — and the war against Ukraine represents a vivid manifestation of this legacy, grounded in archaic logic of coercion, punishment, and subjugation inherent to imperial thinking.
Not an Army, but a Repressive Apparatus
There is a widespread misconception that the problem with the Russian army lies in its inefficiency, technological backwardness, or disregard for the lives of its own soldiers. Yet, as British military analyst Lawrence Freedman rightly notes, “The Russian army is not designed to fight an equal, but to suppress defiance” (Freedman, Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine, 2022).
This is not a combat army — it is a repressive force. Its structure, personnel hierarchy, tactical approaches, and even its uniforms and logistics are adapted to short-term, demonstratively brutal operations against demoralized and weak opponents.
War as a “Special Operation” in Imperial Thinking
When Putin described the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a “special military operation,” he was not merely attempting to avoid legal repercussions — he was conceptually defining the nature of the conflict within the framework of imperial logic.
In his view, Ukraine is not a sovereign state, but rather a temporarily lost territorial possession of Moscow, to be “returned,” not warred against.
This rhetoric is typical of colonial empires of the past: British interventions in India, French ones in Algeria, and Belgian campaigns in the Congo were also framed not as wars, but as “restorations of order.”
“This is not a war, this is a disciplinary mission,” said Russian State Duma deputy Oleg Morozov in February 2022, commenting on the assault on Kyiv (RIA Novosti, 25.02.2022).
“The mistake Western countries make in the Ukrainian conflict,” stated the head of the Russian delegation in negotiations with Ukraine, Vladimir Medinsky, in an interview with The Wall Street Journal, “is that they view it as similar to the rivalry between England and France — two nations with their own history and culture.” According to him, the conflict is a confrontation between two entities with a shared language and culture, which “are essentially one people and doomed to remain close.”
Such statements confirm that Russia’s political elite does not recognize the Ukrainian nation as a distinct historical and cultural entity. It is this logic — the denial of subjectivity — that underpins Moscow’s war against Ukraine, which it perceives not as an independent state, but as part of “historical Russia” to be reclaimed by force. This is not merely ideological framing — it is justification for genocide.
The History of Moscow’s Punitive Wars
Since gaining political agency in 1480, Moscow has not built equal alliances nor engaged in symmetrical warfare. Its military model was forged as an instrument of punishment, aimed not at defeating an enemy, but at suppressing “disobedience.”
This doctrine — deeply internal and colonial in its origins — began to be applied beyond its borders from the 18th century onward.
From the 16th century on, Moscow never waged wars for parity, balance, or diplomacy. Its model includes:
- invasion accompanied by total violence;
- subjugation, regardless of any actual threat;
- assimilation or destruction — with no room for autonomy.
This logic is hereditary, later evolving into the “gendarme of Europe” doctrine, the Soviet export of terror, and the present-day war against Ukraine.
Here is the historical sequence of Russian punitive wars:
16th–17th centuries: The Beginning of Imperial Logic
- 🔻 War with the Kazan Khanate — 1552: Ivan IV (the Terrible) seizes Kazan, the major trading hub on the Volga. This is not a war for territory but a demonstrative punishment of the disobedient — mass executions and the destruction of mosques.
- 🔻 Astrakhan Campaign — 1556: Moscow destroys the Astrakhan Khanate to control trade routes. The pattern remains: siege, purge, total subjugation of the local elite.
- 🔻 War against the Hanseatic League — 16th century: Moscow wages an economic war with German Hanseatic cities, burning Novgorod, destroying trade stations, and banning diplomacy. It’s not just about markets — it’s about monopoly and total control.
18th–19th centuries: Moscow as the Policeman of Monarchies
- 🔻 Gendarme of the Holy Alliance — 1815: After defeating Napoleon, Russia becomes the official gendarme of Europe — a surveillance power stabilizing monarchies by force.
- 🔻 Suppression of revolutions in Italy and Spain — 1821: In alliance with Austria, Russia crushes democratic revolts in Europe.
- 🔻 Hungary — 1849: Tsar Nicholas I sends troops to quell the uprising against the Habsburgs. Moscow acts not as an ally, but as a police battalion for another empire.
- 🔻 Suppression of the Polish uprising — 1863: Russia drowns the Polish national liberation movement in blood — seen in Europe as a blow to “the idea of freedom.”
📌 Mark Mazower: “The Russian army became the weapon of the Holy Alliance. Its function — to protect the old order, even at the cost of intervening against European peoples.”
📌 Tomáš Masaryk: “Russia is not a state — it is a disciplinary apparatus for other states.”
20th century: Escalation of the Repressive Function
- 🔻 Red Terror and wars against independent republics — 1917–1921: The (now Soviet) Moscow refuses to acknowledge the right of Poland, Ukraine, the Caucasus, or Finland to nationhood — only to submission.
- 🔻 Hungary — 1956: Suppression of an anti-Moscow uprising by Soviet tanks. Same logic as 1849, but under a red flag.
- 🔻 Prague — 1968: Invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the “Prague Spring.” No armed resistance — only a psychological terror campaign.
- 🔻 Afghanistan — 1979: Moscow attempts to install a puppet regime through punitive means: raids, village bombings, torture.
21st century: Punishment Without a Mask
- 🔻 Chechnya — 1994–2009: The culmination — Grozny destroyed, filtration camps, public executions, torture, humiliation as military culture. The army operates like NKVD executioners.
- 🔻 Moldova (Transnistria) — 1992–present: Russia fuels separatism, stations the 14th Army, and effectively maintains a colony with a repressive regime. It is a frozen conflict model — punishing Chisinau for trying to leave Moscow’s orbit.
- 🔻 Georgia — 2008: A manufactured war used to punish Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
- 🔻 Ukraine — 2014 (Crimea and Donbas): Territorial seizures and low-intensity warfare — a strategy of “slow pain,” intended to break the opponent’s will.
- 🔻 Syria — 2015–2022: Military intervention to stabilize Assad’s regime. Massive airstrikes on civilian infrastructure — not strategy, but demonstrative punishment of rebellious cities.
- 🔻 Ukraine — 2022–2025 (full-scale invasion): Not a “special operation” but an imperial crackdown: civilian shelling, mass bombings, deportations, terror. The logic: if they will not submit — they must disappear.
Conclusion: Not an Army, But a Punitive Machine
The Russian army has historically never performed a defensive function. It exists as a disciplinary apparatus, enforcing hierarchy through violence — both at home and abroad.
For Russia, war is not the clash of armies — it is a tool of punishment and coercion.
From Hungary to Syria, from Poland to Ukraine — Russia does not fight for security. It enacts the “right to violence” as part of its historic imperial role.
Ukraine as the Exception: the “Wrong Natives”
Moscow did not expect resistance. Within its colonial imagination, Ukrainians were either trained “Russians” or traitors deserving punishment. The military campaign was designed to produce psychological shock and prompt surrender:
“They thought we’d just be scared. That our army would run. That we’d surrender after the first missile hit,” said General Valerii Zaluzhnyi in an interview with The Economist (December 2022).
That did not happen. Ukrainian society proved armed, mobilized, and sovereign. Russia faced not rebellious tribes — but a nation.
An Empire That Denies Nationhood
Russia’s behavior in the war against Ukraine is distinctly anti-sovereign and anti-national — genocidal in character. The Kremlin persistently denies the very existence of Ukraine as a political entity.
“Ukraine as a state never existed. Ukrainians are a Bolshevik invention,” wrote Putin in his 2021 article On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.
This doctrinal denial supposedly legitimizes Russia’s disregard for international law, the UN Charter, and the right of nations to self-determination (see Chapter I, Article 1 of the UN Charter).
Conclusion: Not a War, But Punishment
Thus, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not “war” in the classical sense — it is a colonial punitive operation. The Russian army acts with the logic of “punishing the disobedient,” not “defeating the enemy.”
Moscow does not wage war for political achievement — it enacts violence as a method of reasserting control over its former colony. Therefore, any Russian defeat is not merely military — it is conceptual: the failure of a colonizer unable to subjugate a nation.
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