Six Crises – One Bill: Who Will Pay for the Risks of 2027 Forecast on The Economist's Cover

18 November, 10:16
On November 16th The Economist unveiled the cover of its annual forecast, "The World Ahead 2027". The magazine lists its risks one by one: the aftermath of the war with Iran, artificial intelligence, pressure on government bond markets, Donald Trump's final years in office, Marine Le Pen in France, China and Taiwan. Each risk gets its own article, its own author and its own symbol on the cover. The reader comes away thinking these are entirely separate problems that happen to fall in the same year.

Are they really separate? Put two simple questions to each risk, where the money goes and who pays for the consequences, and six separate stories turn into one. The richest state in the world is passing through the same phase its predecessors passed through, and it is shifting the cost of that phase onto people who made none of the decisions.

Two tools

Answering those questions takes two tools. They are worth keeping apart, because each answers a different question.

The first belongs to the Italian economist Giovanni Arrighi. He traced how the centres of world capital succeeded one another: Genoa, Holland, Britain, the United States. Each followed roughly the same path. First the centre made its money in trade and production. When profits there began to fall, capital moved into finance, that is, into loans, bonds and speculation. The country grew richer in money but poorer in its ability to create new wealth.

Following the French historian Fernand Braudel, Arrighi called this financial phase the autumn of a hegemon. The system is still rich but no longer growing, and great fortunes become a sign of decline rather than strength. Arrighi also showed where capital flees during this phase. Dutch money was invested in England; London's money financed the rise of America. The old centre fed its successor and in time gave up its place to it.

The second tool is the concept of the economics of losses, which I set out in my book "The Economics of Losses" (Ukrainian edition: "Економіка збитків"). Arrighi explains why a hegemon weakens and where its money goes. He does not explain why its autumn drags on for decades, or who pays for prolonging it. The economics of losses describes exactly that mechanism. The state systematically lifts risk off private capital and shifts it onto taxpayers. Profits stay private; losses become public. War is the most convenient way to do this, because nobody can verify what it really costs.

So Arrighi answers the question of what is happening to America. The economics of losses answers the question of who pays for it. The Economist's cover illustrates both answers rather well.

A trillionaire at the top, tents at the bottom

The cover was drawn by the American artist Cleon Peterson. A globe in red, black and white is divided from top to bottom. At the top stand the rich and powerful, men in expensive suits among flags. At the bottom are tents and people sitting on the bare ground. Between them lie wars, missiles, a bank beside a chart line plunging downward, wildfires and technology.

Arrighi described this picture too. In the financial phase of every hegemon he saw a short period he called the "belle époque". Wealth at the top grows, and the elite feels that prosperity has returned, even though production has stopped growing and the majority is no better off.

Britain had its belle époque at the turn of the 20th century. London lent money to the whole world, and bankers and aristocrats lived in unheard-of luxury. A few years later the first world war broke out, and Britain emerged from it as a debtor of the United States.

The letter from Tom Standage, deputy editor of The Economist and editor of the forecast, opens with the news that a space tycoon has become the world's first trillionaire. Picture it: a trillionaire at the top, tents at the bottom. This is what the late stage of financial expansion looks like. Capital piles up at the top, while the well-being of the majority does not improve. The hegemon still has enormous sums of money, but fewer and fewer ways to turn them into new production and development.

The crisis of British hegemony lasted from 1914 to 1945. America's is following a similar script, only more slowly. The first signal came in the early 1970s, when Washington cut the dollar's link to gold and capital began to move out of production and into finance. The current, deeper phase of the crisis began with the financial crash of 2008.

Why, then, does this phase last so long without ending in collapse? The six risks on the cover provide the explanation, once you look at who pays for each of them.

A war other people pay for

On the cover, beside a camel under a red crescent, stands a tanker bound in chains, with a warship and fighter jets above it. The Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passage out of the Persian Gulf, was closed at the end of February. Mr Standage writes that the consequences of the war with Iran will be felt in the region's politics, in energy and in food supplies long after it ends. The magazine also concedes that the war has weakened America's standing among allies and adversaries alike.

Britain, too, discovered its weakness in a war. London did eventually defeat the Boers in South Africa, but for almost three years, from 1899 to 1902, it could not overcome the resistance of farmers. For the rest of the world it was plain evidence that the richest empire on the planet could no longer quickly subdue even a small opponent. Iran has become the same kind of evidence for America.

Imagine a farmer in Egypt or India buying fertiliser in the spring. The Strait of Hormuz carries not only oil and gas but also a large share of the world's fertiliser. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation warned that shortages would cut harvests, because fertiliser must be applied at a particular moment and lost time cannot be made up later. So the war raises the farmer's costs.

In the autumn he will harvest less grain, and bread in Cairo will cost more. The farmer has never been to Iran, decided nothing in Washington and has no connection whatsoever to American foreign policy. Yet he will pay the price of this war out of his own pocket.

Arms makers and oil companies, by contrast, earn extra profits. This is the mechanism of the economics of losses. The costs of a war are easy to shift onto others, while checking how much it really cost, and who received the money, is almost impossible.

Meanwhile the market trades on hope. In early November the price of Brent crude fell by 16% in a single week as traders bet on a deal with Tehran. To the farmer in Egypt these expectations make no difference at all. His costs rose back in the spring, and falling futures prices will not give him the money back.

Public debt, private income

Expensive oil fuels inflation, and inflation changes the price of money. At the start of the year markets expected the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates. Instead, in September the Fed raised its rate for the first time since 2023, and by November its officials were discussing even faster increases.

For an ordinary person this means a pricier mortgage, a pricier car loan and higher credit-card payments.

Governments will have to borrow at higher cost too. And they borrow all the time. The OECD estimates that in 2026 alone governments and companies around the world will borrow a record $29trn on bond markets. Some 78% of what OECD governments borrow this year will go to repaying old debt. In other words, new debt is taken on mostly to pay off the old.

Who will repay this money? The same farmer, the same buyer of bread, the same mortgage holder. Only now not through the price of fertiliser or grain, but through taxes and the public spending out of which interest is paid.

The owner of bonds bought at a high yield has little to worry about. His income is guaranteed by the state. The state, in turn, takes its money from taxpayers. So in the end society pays, while the income goes to the owner of the financial asset.

Arrighi would see here the familiar picture of the financial phase, in which money is made on debt rather than on production. The economics of losses adds the crucial detail: who exactly services this debt, and why nobody asks them.

Artificial intelligence as capital's new colony

On the left side of the cover, a human brain drawn as a microchip is surrounded by binary code, and beside it a robot runs off with a sack.

In its financial phase every hegemon accumulates more money than it can invest at the old rate of return. Dutch capital once went to England, British capital to America. Where can American capital go now? There is no second America on the planet. China will not do, because there the state keeps control of the commanding heights of the economy. Europe has not become a trouble-free destination either, partly because of Washington's own policies.

So capital is looking for new territory to expand into. This time the territory has no borders on a political map, and its name is artificial intelligence. Data centres are becoming the colonies of the 21st century. They are built with borrowed money, and the complex financial deals behind them are ever harder to trace. Even Mr Standage warns that companies are taking on complex and opaque debt, so the risk of a sharp crash is rising.

While share prices climb, most of the profit goes to company founders and investment funds. But banks are already quietly selling off the loans they made to build data centres. To whom? To private-credit funds, pension funds and insurance companies. In other words, the risk passes to people who are saving for old age or insuring their future.

If the bubble bursts, it will most likely be declared systemically important and rescued at society's expense. This happened in 2008. Back then the rescue went to banks stuffed with mortgage securities; this time data centres may end up in the same role.

The first conflicts are already appearing beyond the stock exchange. A large data centre consumes as much electricity and water as a small town might need. Local residents are starting to compete with technology companies for resources. In America the issue has already reached Congress; in Europe people are taking to the streets. Capital gains new territory to make money in, while local communities get extra strain on their power grids and water mains.

Trump and rules that do not apply to everyone

Mr Standage believes Mr Trump will not become an ordinary lame duck, a president nearing the end of his term and losing influence. Instead he may turn into a destructive Angry Bird. The magazine expects more executive orders, more court battles and more military ventures.

Arrighi explains why this matters. Hegemony, as he understood it, means leadership that others accept willingly, because the leader's rules benefit them too. As a hegemon weakens, it relies more and more on force rather than consent. Arrighi called this state "domination without hegemony". Rules stop being the basis of a shared order and become an instrument of pressure. Washington demands that allies honour their agreements while making exceptions for itself.

Arrighi did not examine what this means for capital, though that is the decisive consequence. Wealth and trust grow where the law is the same for everyone. When the law becomes a privilege for those close to power, capital sooner or later starts looking for a safer place. Not necessarily at once, but the process is hard to stop once it begins. America's problem is that there is not yet any other safe place for big capital, and Washington is making sure none appears.

A successor that may never be

The Economist names the French presidential election as Europe's main political event of 2027. On its cover the magazine asks what could be mightier than Le Pen. Her party leads the polls, and the magazine writes that a victory for Marine Le Pen could shake the Franco-German axis.

The stakes are far higher than the political future of one country. By Arrighi's logic, the old hegemon's capital ought to be looking for a new centre, and Europe could become one. For that it needs economic and political unity of its own. The foundation of that unity was precisely the Paris-Berlin axis, and it was that axis which could have become the basis of a new European power.

If this link breaks apart because of internal disputes, Washington will not even need to lift a finger to stop a rival from emerging. Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to object to a weaker Europe either.

China is in no hurry to take someone else's place

In Asia, The Economist calls 2027 the year of China's military readiness. By the centenary of the People's Liberation Army, Beijing has ordered its armed forces to be ready for possible operations against Taiwan.

But readiness for war is not a political decision to start one. America's intelligence agencies, in their annual assessment for 2026, likewise conclude that China's leaders are not planning an invasion in 2027 and have no fixed timetable. Why Beijing is in no hurry becomes clearer from the economic side of the question, and here Arrighi's theory is useful again.

In the 2000s China poured money into the American economy, above all by buying US Treasury bonds. In effect it financed the reigning hegemon. Genoa once did the same, lending to the Spanish crown, and in the end found itself dependent on someone else's politics. Chinese holdings of American Treasuries peaked in 2013, and since then Beijing has been gradually stepping out of that model.

A potential successor does not necessarily want to take its predecessor's place right away. For China, a war over Taiwan would mean not only military costs but also the need to shoulder the enormous political and economic obligations of the world's centre. That is exactly the kind of dependence Beijing is trying to escape. So its military readiness may serve above all as a tool of bargaining and deterrence, rather than as proof of an inevitable decision to go to war.

The viceroy by the leaking pipe

Mr Peterson did not forget Moscow. On the right side of the cover stands a Kremlin tower topped with a red star. In front of it are a horseman and an hourglass, and nearby lies a damaged pipe with liquid pouring out of it.

It is a fairly precise metaphor for the Russian historical model. For centuries Moscow served stronger centres of power and lived off external sources of income. First it was the Golden Horde, the Mongol state centred on the Volga; then the trading and financial centres of Europe; and in modern times the global market, where Russia sold raw materials for dollars. Moscow's tasks were set from outside, the results of its work were bought from outside, and the force it was given Moscow turned on its neighbours. That is why its role is best described by the word "viceroy". I examine this model in detail in my book "The Russian Myth" (Ukrainian edition: "Русскій Міфъ").

The viceroy's economic model rested largely on pipes that carried resources to foreign buyers. Now that model is breaking down from two sides. Europe, the main buyer of Russian gas, is banning it by law in 2027. America, which set the rules of the world market, is itself in crisis.

On the cover this looks symbolic. The horseman stands by the damaged pipe, the hourglass measures out the time, and the horseman is looking for a new master. Perhaps China. But Beijing is willing to buy cheap Russian oil, not to share political privileges with Moscow. The viceroy is being offered the place of a supplier, not of an equal partner.

The war in Ukraine as the new normal

In the press summaries of the ten main trends of 2027, Russia's war against Ukraine does not appear as a separate item. It shows up only as an example China has to take into account.

The simplest explanation is that the top ten is an editorial selection of new trends, not a complete list of the events the magazine covers. The war is mentioned in the issue itself.

The economics of losses offers another explanation. A war whose costs nobody intends to audit in full gradually becomes background noise. While it is seen as an emergency, it makes the covers. Once it becomes part of everyday life, it is mentioned mostly when its price needs discussing, or the possibility of spending less on it.

America has its own economic interests here. It sells Europe weapons for Ukraine and supplies Europe with gas in place of Russian gas. This does not mean Washington determines how long the war lasts or wants to prolong it for profit. But the economic benefits of the current state of affairs are real, and reducing them is not necessarily in the interest of every party.

For Ukraine, this is probably the main news of 2027, and it is missing from The Economist's forecast. The world is preparing for a new year in which Russia's war against Ukraine has already become a routine feature of international politics.

Who will pay for America's autumn

Reviews of The Economist's new forecast usually end with advice to draw up a plan of action in advance, since 2027 promises high volatility. But a plan does little for someone who cannot shift his own losses onto others.

Those who will come through this year best are the ones closer to government decisions than to stock-market quotes. They have access to mechanisms that let them keep the profits for themselves and spread the losses among everyone else.

Everyone else will pay. The farmer in Egypt pays with dearer fertiliser and bread. The American taxpayer pays with interest on the national debt. The pensioner puts his savings at risk in funds that bought loans backing a new technology bubble. Ukraine pays with a war the world is getting used to not noticing.

According to Arrighi, a hegemon's autumn ends when a new centre emerges that is able to absorb capital and set new rules. Europe may fail to become that centre because of its own divisions, and China is in no hurry to become it. So America's autumn will last a long time yet, and it will last for exactly as long as its cost can be shifted onto those who decided nothing.

If you enjoyed this piece, you might also be interested in my books: The Economics of Losses, available in English and in Ukrainian, and The Russian Myth, available in English and in Ukrainian.