21 June, 15:21
Even if one sets aside the fact that the statement of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin — “where the foot of the Russian soldier steps, there is Russia” — almost literally reproduces the rhetoric of Adolf Hitler (“where the German soldier stands, there is no room for anyone else”), this alone does not permit interpreting it as an accidental remark, improvisation, or a display of imperial arrogance.
On the contrary — it is a concentrated ideological formula that derives law from the fact of violence, substitutes international legitimacy with military control, and proclaims military presence a sufficient condition of sovereignty.
This declarative formula fully encapsulates the core of modern Russian imperial political practice, where military presence is treated as the primary and sufficient source of legitimizing territorial claims. At the same time, it outlines the ontology of political power, the nature of Russian expansionism, and the Kremlin’s internal conception of law and violence.
Military Presence as a Substitute for Legitimacy
The formula articulated by Putin effectively rejects any other elements of legal or democratic foundations. The “soldier’s foot” in this context is a euphemism for violent invasion, declared a sufficient condition for recognizing a territory as “Russian.”
In terms of political philosophy, this implies the replacement of jus gentium (the law of nations) with jus ad bellum (the right to war), not as a last resort, but as a systemic norm of foreign policy.
Rejection of International Order
This understanding of legitimacy directly contradicts the fundamental principles of international law, including the principle of the inviolability of borders as enshrined in the UN Charter. The Kremlin’s position nullifies the concept of sovereignty as a product of self-determination and agreement, replacing it with the fact of control established through armed presence.
Within this worldview:
borders are temporary,
treaties are instrumental,
and the political will of the population is non-obligatory.
An Archaic Model of Violence-Based Legitimacy
Conceptually, such a model of power does not refer to the modern, unified state but instead to feudal or colonial logic, wherein law emerges not from procedural legitimacy, but from the fact of violent domination. This is not the thinking of a nation-state, but of a punitive subject who considers any territory under its military control to be its own.
Accordingly, the Russian soldier, in this logic, is not merely the executor of orders but the sole legitimate bearer of “Russian” sovereignty — for his physical presence constitutes the act of transforming any territorial space into “Russian.”
The Formula of the “Russian Myth”
The formula of the “Russian myth” essentially boils down to a pseudo-logical tautology:
“Russia is wherever a Russian soldier is present.”
In other words, territorial belonging is determined not by political self-determination of peoples, but by the presence of military representation. In this sense, war is not a form of violence within politics — it becomes the very foundation of law.
The Conflict Between Violence and Myth
However, upon deeper analysis, this doctrine reveals an internal paradox. If war is required for a territory to become part of the “Russian myth,” this indicates a complete absence of vitality or positive attractiveness of the model itself. It proves utterly incapable of spreading through voluntary consent, participation, or cultural gravity. It expands exclusively through violence and coercion.
Thus, Putin’s formula is both an affirmation of power and a self-negation of the “Russian myth”: no one voluntarily desires to be part of it.
The Soldier as a Substitute for the Social Contract
In democratic models, the state is understood as the product of a social contract. In Putin’s Russia, this contract is not concluded — it is imposed. The army replaces legal mechanisms, and coercion replaces participation. This means that violence is not a tool of power but its very essence.
Simulated Legitimacy: The Role of “Referendums”
To mask violent annexation, the Kremlin uses “referendums” that serve not as expressions of popular will, but as post-facto rituals designed to retroactively formalize what has already been done. Such procedures hold no legal validity under conditions of occupation but are employed as propaganda tools for legitimizing invasion.
The Ethical Contradictions of “Compromise”
Against this backdrop, calls for Ukraine to accept a “compromise” for the sake of peace appear especially cynical. This is not a negotiation between equal subjects but a request for the victim to recognize the legitimacy of its own violation. Such a position contradicts both legal logic and moral reason.
Geopolitical Context: Limits of Western Intervention
The response of the United States and its allies is often shaped by proxy logic: Russia acts through “nameless groups,” pseudo-states, “referendums,” and private military companies — thereby allowing Western actors to avoid direct responsibility. As the case of Syria (Deir ez-Zor, 2018) demonstrates, direct confrontation between the U.S. and Russian proxies is possible only in cases of immediate threat to American troops. In other situations — including Ukraine — the West’s policy remains indirect, cautious, and strategically calibrated, but ultimately insufficiently decisive.
Conclusion
Putin’s formula is neither accidental nor emotional. It crystallizes a new type of Russian imperial thinking, in which violence is not a tool of politics, but its sole foundation. The presence of a soldier becomes the criterion of sovereignty, and subjugation — a form of integration. This is an open rejection of the liberal model of world order and a direct return to pre-modern concepts of violent legitimism. If the West accepts this model — even partially — it accepts that the right of force has once again become the primary form of political argument.
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