5 June, 19:31
July 11 has now been declared the National Day of Remembrance for Poles – Victims of Genocide, allegedly committed, according to the resolution of the Sejm, by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) on the “eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic.”
The official position of the Polish Sejm
The official formulation states that over 100,000 Poles were murdered between 1939 and 1946, mostly fellow villagers, their property destroyed, and hundreds of thousands forced to flee. The Polish parliament emphasized:
“A martyr's death due to belonging to the Polish nation deserves to be remembered in the form of a national day annually conferred by the Polish state, a day on which victims shall be mourned.”
This is not the first — and likely not the last — example of the painful episode of Volhynia in 1943 being used as a political card. But what if we abandoned clichés and examined the history of Ukrainian–Polish relations as it truly was?
The Volhynian tragedy as an object of historical manipulation
The ambiguity of interpretations
The Polish political and publicist tradition presents the events in Volhynia in 1943 exclusively as an act of ethnic cleansing organized by Ukrainian nationalists. However, the historical context reveals a more complex picture:
The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was not only fighting against Germans or Bolsheviks, but also against Polish underground armed formations — the Home Army (Armia Krajowa), Peasant Battalions (Bataliony Chłopskie), and others.
Since 1942, Polish structures had already been conducting repressive actions against Ukrainian civilians: punitive raids, village burnings, and executions of noncombatants.
Ukrainians also suffered massive losses: in villages such as Sahryń, Piskary, Pavlokoma, Zavadka Morokhivska, Lishnya, and Malkovychi, thousands of peaceful Ukrainian civilians were killed.
An interethnic conflict, not genocide
The use of the term "genocide" regarding the events in Volhynia contradicts international legal norms. According to the 1948 UN Convention, genocide is defined as the deliberate and systematic destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, typically by state actors. In the case of Volhynia, we are dealing with:
The absence of any state vertical or authority on Ukrainian lands in 1943;
Multi-sided violence under conditions of German occupation and Soviet partisan terror;
A reaction to decades of discriminatory policies imposed by the Polish state during the interwar period.
Most international historians interpret the Volhynian tragedy as an episode of a war of all against all on stateless territory: the USSR, the Third Reich, Polish underground, UPA, and criminal formations all operated simultaneously.
The colonial subtext: “Eastern territories of Poland”
The phrase “eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic,” as used in the Sejm’s resolution, is politically loaded and historically incorrect. It refers to Volhynia, Galicia, Chełm region, and Podlasie — ethnically Ukrainian territories, inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians (70–90% during the interwar period), which Poland seized following its betrayal of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR) in 1919–1921.
The Polish authorities granted no autonomy to Ukrainians on these lands; on the contrary, they destroyed schools and churches, persecuted the intelligentsia, and suppressed Ukrainian identity. Calling these territories “historically Polish” means legitimizing imperial expansion and turning colonial policy into a narrative of victimhood.
The problem of inflated numbers
While the Polish side frequently invokes the figure of “hundreds of thousands of victims,” scholarly estimates indicate otherwise:
In Volhynia, between 1943 and 1944, between 40,000 and 60,000 Poles were killed, according to various assessments.
In turn, around 20,000 Ukrainians were killed as a result of retaliatory operations by the Home Army and related units.
Thus, the tragedy was bilateral, and labeling it as “genocide” applied to only one side is a political interpretation, not a legal judgment.
Polish crimes against Ukrainians
Repressions after the First World War
1918–1919: Poland destroyed the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR), which had been fighting for independence.
1920: The UNR was betrayed by Poland during the signing of the Treaty of Riga with the Bolsheviks, effectively handing Ukraine over to Soviet control.
Pacification in the 1930s
In 1930, the Polish government conducted a "pacification" of Eastern Galicia: house searches, arrests, school closures, beatings, arson, and forced assimilation.
Ukrainian schools, churches, and cooperatives were banned, and the population subjected to Polonization.
Operation “Vistula” (Akcja "Wisła") in 1947
The forcible resettlement of over 150,000 Ukrainians from their native lands — Lemkivshchyna, Nadsiannia, Chełm region.
Deportations, scattering of families, and assimilation through displacement to the north and west of Poland.
Poland as the beneficiary of the Yalta Conference
There is a paradox of historical memory: modern Poland, which appeals to “historical territories,” actually acquired half of its current territory from Stalin — as former German lands: Silesia, Pomerania, parts of East Prussia (Wrocław, Szczecin), and Gdańsk (Danzig).
After 1945, millions of Germans were deported.
These lands were resettled by Poles from central regions and deported Ukrainians.
Poland holds these territories not by “historical right,” but by decisions of the great powers at Yalta and by virtue of Soviet military force.
Thus, Poland's moral authority to lecture others on "ethnic justice" is highly questionable.
The “Blue Army” and betrayal of Ukrainian statehood
It is historically absurd that Poland gained its sovereignty largely through Western assistance, intended for the fight against Bolshevism. The French formed and armed a 100,000-strong Polish army under General Józef Haller — but it was deployed not against Moscow, but against Ukrainians in Lviv.
In 1919, this army fought against the ZUNR.
In 1921, Poland ultimately renounced support for the UNR, recognizing Soviet control in exchange for fixed borders under the Treaty of Riga.
These facts show that Poland viewed Ukraine not as an ally, but as territory to be controlled or destroyed.
Historical memory as a tool of political games
The announcement of this new “day of remembrance” coincides with a political cycle in Poland: the rise of nationalist forces, internal political competition, and electoral mobilization based on “Polish suffering.”
This is a blow to Polish-Ukrainian dialogue, particularly in times of war when both nations must stand together against a common enemy.
The issue lies not only in the law itself, but in the political logic: each time Ukraine asserts itself, Poland's nationalist circles revive the theme of “Ukrainian genocide.”
Conclusion: Memory must be reciprocal
Ukrainians were for centuries victims of Polish expansion, repression, and ethnocide — from the Union of Brest to Operation “Vistula.”
Historical memory cannot be a one-sided tribunal. Especially in wartime, when solidarity is more important than retrospective grievances.
Poland has no moral right to monopolize victimhood, especially in judging the actions of a subjugated nation fighting for survival under conditions of occupation, genocide, and betrayal.
📌 If we are to play the politics of memory — let us play by equal standards.
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