The Rhetoric of “Liberation Internationalism” as an Instrument of the Kremlin’s Neo-Imperial Policy

Through the deconstruction of the discourse on “struggle against imperialism,” “defense of progressive forces,” and “threat to the USSR's defense capacity,” Kremlin propagandists masked the true reasons for such interventions and their complete detachment from the real interests of the populations of both the metropole and the colonial “partners.”

The Ideologeme of “Anti-Imperialism” as a Mechanism to Legitimize Kremlin Interventions

The USSR’s intervention in the Angolan civil war was presented as support for the “progressive forces” in their struggle against “American and South African imperialism.” Such rhetoric enabled the Kremlin to disguise its real motives — geopolitical control over a strategic region rich in natural resources (oil, diamonds) and transportation infrastructure.

However, by the end of the active phase of the conflict, it became clear:

• The USSR gained no strategic advantages;
• No enemy military bases appeared in the region;
• The myth of “defending the homeland in faraway Africa” failed every practical test.

Outcomes for the Metropole: Militarization Without Dividends

The financial and human losses of the USSR in this “international assistance” were significant.
According to various estimates, the losses of Soviet troops and mercenaries numbered in the thousands.

Cuba, as the USSR’s direct military subcontractor, also gained no long-term benefits from its participation — neither economic nor diplomatic.

Moreover:

• Angolan debts were later forgiven;
• No preferences exist for Russian businesses in the 21st century;
• The political capital accumulated during the war was exhausted almost immediately after the USSR collapsed.

Continuation of the Rhetorical Tradition in Russian Neo-Imperialism

Modern Russian foreign policy reproduces these same patterns — only now, “socialist friends” have been replaced by “anti-American allies,” and the terminology has become more hybrid.

• “Sovereign democracies,”
• “Multipolarity,”
• “Struggle against neocolonialism.”

All of this serves the same function as during the USSR: to replace pragmatic analysis of political and economic interests with an ideological phantom.

From Angola to Mozambique: A Recurrent Strategy of “Exporting Influence”

Mozambique is another case of Soviet military-political expansion, where Moscow, under the banner of anti-colonialism, supported FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in the conflict against the RENAMO movement. As in Angola, the Kremlin spent considerable resources on armament, military training, and ideological infrastructure.

The result was typical:

• After gaining independence, Mozambique did not become a strategic partner of the USSR;
• The country’s political system quickly shifted to pragmatic cooperation with former adversaries;
• Post-Soviet Russia turned out to be marginal in the economic life of the region.

New Forms of Colonialism: Chad and the CAR as Laboratories of Neo-Empire

In the 21st century, Moscow abandoned communist ideology but retained the imperial ambition for external influence, now — through private military companies (PMCs), information operations, and the diplomacy of “promised sovereignty.”

Central African Republic (CAR)

Since 2017, Russia has actively infiltrated the security, political, and informational structures of the CAR by offering:

• Weapons in exchange for loyalty;
• Military protection of the government via the Wagner PMC;
• Promises of “protection from French neocolonialism.”

In fact, the CAR has become a Russian colonial enclave in the heart of Africa.

• The country’s Minister of Defense is a pro-Russian appointee;
• Control over gold and diamond deposits passed to companies associated with structures linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin;
• Russian mercenaries participated in punitive operations against the opposition, including documented war crimes (see UN reports, 2021–2023).

The rhetoric has not changed: “struggle against colonialism,” “multipolarity,” “fraternal support” — but behind it lies an extractive model in which Russia:

• Does not invest;
• Does not develop infrastructure;
• Does not provide educational or humanitarian aid — it merely extracts resources and legitimizes dictatorship.

Chad

After 2021, Russia intensified its activity in Chad using the same tools:

• Media operations (via Sputnik Afrique);
• Offers of military support amid instability;
• Creation of an “anti-French” front in the Sahel, which is de facto controlled by Moscow (via Mali, Burkina Faso, CAR, now Chad as well).

In April 2024, PMCs linked to the new structure based on Wagner officially signed an agreement to guard key sites in N'Djamena and began consulting Chad's military command.

Conclusion: Old Clichés — New Pitfalls

Despite the shift in rhetorical cover from “communism” to “conservative values,” the essence of Russian foreign policy in “Third World” countries remains unchanged:

• Economic inefficiency;
• Lack of systemic presence after military missions end;
• Loss of invested resources and capital;
• Discrediting of the very idea of international solidarity;
• Reinforcement of Russia’s image as a toxic, dishonest actor using “anti-Western” rhetoric solely for short-term gain;
• All narratives about “Africa’s untold riches” in reality turn into Africa exploiting Russia;
• Geopolitical bartering of “weapons for loyalty” brings no strategic benefit but creates toxic dependencies;
• Any attempt to “punish traitors” who turn away from Moscow is unrealistic given Russia’s isolation and the geographic inaccessibility of its vassals.

These colonial experiments not only fail to strengthen Russia’s global position — on the contrary, they cluster around it parasitic regimes that will vanish with the first change in the climate of great geopolitics.

The attempt to restore imperial positions using post-Soviet rhetoric is not only ineffective but self-destructive.
The Kremlin continues to act according to a colonial-paternalistic template, investing billions in reputationally toxic regimes that have no intention of remaining loyal — and certainly no intention of repaying debts.

As in the case of Angola, the real result is: a deficit in the budget, and a surplus in the international community’s cynicism toward any Russian initiative.