Why Communism Didn't Survive

19 November, 15:39
On November 6, the American historian Stephen Kotkin published an essay titled "Soviet disunion". He asks two questions: why the communist regime collapsed in the Soviet Union, and why it survived in China.

Kotkin's answer is simple. A communist party can allow private trade and private enterprise and still stay in power. What it cannot do is share power itself: allow free elections, other parties or a free press. Moscow did exactly that in the 1920s, and Deng Xiaoping did it in the 1980s. Gorbachev proclaimed glasnost, or openness, and held elections with more than one candidate. After that, in Kotkin's view, the system killed itself. He calls the reform "a choice, not a necessity". The Union, he writes, could have gone on living off Siberian oil and gas.

In Russia, the essay was read with pleasure. One Russian author retold it for his readers and drew a lesson for today's Moscow. What keeps the Russian system stable, he writes, is the market economy, a "NEP-2", a second edition of Lenin's New Economic Policy of the 1920s, and everyone should pray to it.

Think about what is being said here. The communists went into power to abolish private property, and the market along with it. In the "Communist Manifesto" of 1848, Marx and Engels boiled their whole theory down to a single sentence: the abolition of private property. By Kotkin's logic, a communist party survives precisely when it brings back both property and the market, gives up everything it took power for, and keeps nothing but power itself. In 1921, Lenin at least honestly called the NEP a retreat. More than 100 years later, the Russian author calls that retreat a "skrepa", the Kremlin's word for the sacred bonds that hold the nation together, and asks everyone to pray to it. The market that communism promised to destroy is now declared the medicine that keeps communist power alive.

Both the American historian and his Russian reader take the Soviet Union for an independent power that decided its own fate. My answer is different. From 1945, the leading power of the world, the hegemon, was the United States. World trade ran in its currency and at the prices of its market. The hegemon held a monopoly on Siberian raw materials. It did not need to buy them itself. Soviet oil went mostly to Europe, but it was sold for dollars and at prices set neither in Moscow nor in Europe.

When Europe tried to deal with Moscow directly, over Siberian gas, the hegemon stepped in. In June 1982, Reagan banned European firms from supplying equipment for a new gas pipeline from Siberia. French, British, Italian and German companies defied the ban, and in November it was lifted.

It was Moscow that collected and sold the Siberian raw materials. With the hegemon's currency it fed its cities and paid for its army, and with the army it kept down the lands those raw materials came from. That is the post of a viceroy.

In 1971, the hegemon stopped exchanging dollars for gold, and its own crisis began. By the mid-1980s, America itself was living on borrowed money and started cutting its costs. It cut the viceroy's revenue, and when the viceroy came asking for loans, it forbade it to use force. Britain had done the same more than 40 years earlier. It "let go" of its colonies, which in practice meant it stopped paying for officials and troops there and shifted those costs onto the colonies themselves. The hegemon shifted its costs onto Moscow and handed it the bill. The Moscow model lived on outside money and could not stand without it. First the Warsaw Pact countries fell away from Moscow, then the Soviet republics. After that, the hegemon had to rescue Moscow itself: it needed the debtor alive.

Without this, neither the end of the Union and its transformation into the Russian Federation, nor the survival of the Chinese Communist Party can be explained. Kotkin's own essay shows it best. The necessary facts are in it, and the author walks past every one of them.

It is tempting to call Moscow in this position a colony, only a hidden one, a "crypto-colony". I used to think so myself. It is a mistake. There is a colony here, but it is the lands Moscow ruled: Siberia with its oil and gas, the Soviet republics, the Warsaw Pact countries. A colony has no army of its own, and it does not seize other people's lands. Moscow had an army, and it seized those lands itself. A colony is robbed. Moscow did the robbing, and sold the loot for the hegemon's currency.

That is why Moscow is a viceroy. The hegemon places over it neither a garrison nor a governor, and spends not a single dollar on its lands. The viceroy pays for the army, the viceroy puts down the discontented, the viceroy gathers the raw materials. And what the viceroy earns, it sends back into the hegemon's own economy: it keeps its money in the hegemon's banks and buys the hegemon's debt. There its money blooms and flourishes. That is how they live, the viceroy and the hegemon. When the hegemon needed to cut costs, it made the viceroy pay.

Where is Kotkin right? He clears away the false causes of the collapse. The Pope, the national movements, the dissidents, Reagan, the military industry, Afghanistan. For each one, he shows that it did not bring the Union down. He is especially convincing on Afghanistan. At the peak of the Vietnam War, 550,000 American soldiers were fighting there. There were never more than 120,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, although Afghanistan is almost four times the size of South Vietnam. The entire ten-year war cost the Soviet budget as much as 1 year of farm subsidies.

Those subsidies did not feed the country. In 1970, the Union bought about 2 million tons of grain abroad. By March 1985, purchases for a single season approached 50 million tons. Almost 20 million of them were sold by the United States. American intelligence put the Soviet Union's own 1984 harvest at 180 million tons. The foreign grain had to be paid for in dollars.

Where did Moscow get its dollars? Kotkin himself says so, in that very sentence about Siberian oil and gas. In 1984, oil and gas brought the Union about 25 billion dollars of its 30 billion in hard-currency earnings. Oil was sold on the world market for dollars. Only the price of a barrel was not decided in Moscow.

Kotkin knows this. He mentions that the world oil price fell in 1985. And he immediately pushes that fact aside. The downturn in the Soviet economy, he writes, officially began only in 1990, after the reforms. So the reforms are to blame.

This is his main mistake. He judges the Soviet economy by its total output, the way one judges the economy of an independent country. A viceroy should be judged by its earnings in the hegemon's currency. With those earnings, Moscow bought bread for its cities. As long as they were enough, Moscow borrowed from no one, and no one set it conditions. In 1986, the Union received about 7 billion dollars for its oil. That was half of what it had earned two years earlier. The factories went on working as before. There was nothing left to pay for grain with.

Then Moscow started borrowing. At the end of 1985, its hard-currency debt stood at 31 billion dollars. By the end of 1990, it had reached about 55 billion. Three quarters of that sum the Union owed to Western commercial banks.

What happened next was described by Yegor Gaidar, who later became Russia's acting prime minister. In 1989, Moscow asked a consortium of 300 banks for a loan. Five agreed to lend. The bankers explained to Soviet officials that there would be no more commercial money and that they had to turn to Western governments. Governments lend under political conditions. Gorbachev, according to Gaidar, needed at least 100 billion dollars.

There was one condition: no use of force. In 1989, Moscow did not send tanks into Eastern Europe, and within a few weeks the communist regimes there were gone. In January 1991, it tried to take back the Baltic states by force. The West replied that Moscow could do as it pleased, but then it could forget about the 100-billion-dollar loan. Moscow backed down.

The army had not gone anywhere. In January 1991, Soviet tanks rolled into Vilnius and seized the television tower. Moscow could no longer put its army to use: any use of force threatened to cost it its Western loans. That is how the viceroy lost the lands it controlled only by force of arms. In 1989 it lost Eastern Europe, in 1991 the Soviet republics.

Bonn paid for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany. It gave Moscow 12 billion Deutschmarks plus a 3-billion interest-free loan. United Germany stayed in NATO. In July 1991, the G7 in London refused Gorbachev billions in direct aid and offered technical assistance instead. America cut its own troops in Europe as well: from 315,225 in 1989 to 107,158 in 1995.

Set this against Kotkin's thesis of free choice. He writes that the attempt to turn back by force in 1991 failed, and looks for the reason in how the party and the republics were organized. Gaidar's reason is simpler. There was no money for force, and money went only to those who did not use it. Hence my conclusion. The political concessions Kotkin calls Gorbachev's mistake were the price of the loan. The conditions were set by the lender.

It had happened before, with Britain. In 1946, the United States gave Britain a loan of 3.75 billion dollars on condition that by July 1947 the pound would become freely convertible into other currencies. By the end of the war, Britain owed India itself 1.335 billion pounds. In August 1947, India became independent. Ten years earlier, on April 1, 1937, London had separated Burma and Aden from India, which until then had been governed from India. The Union went the same way. In 1989 Moscow lost the Warsaw Pact countries, in 1991 the Union itself fell apart. The difference is that India was ruled by a British viceroy, and the British Parliament released it by an act of its own. Moscow was counted as an independent power, and no one ever passed an act about it. Washington demanded only one thing of it: no use of force.

This story has a precedent. Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde, lived on duties from the Black Sea trade. In 1453 the Ottomans took Constantinople, in 1475 the Genoese port of Kaffa in Crimea, and that trade passed under their control. Sarai was left without its duties, could no longer maintain its army, and fell. Kotkin explains the end of the Union by communist ideology. The Horde had neither a communist party nor a communist ideology. It collapsed when its income was taken away. Moscow acted differently: it cut the cost of its punitive army itself. Garrisons in Eastern Europe and in the republics became more than it could afford, and it pulled them out. In East Germany alone, more than 300,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed. The army that remained was enough for Moscow not to lose the rest of its lands.

Why, then, did the Chinese Communist Party survive? Kotkin answers that Deng Xiaoping allowed private enterprise and did not share power. Look at whom Deng began selling to. On January 1, 1979, Beijing and Washington established diplomatic relations. At the end of January, Deng flew to America. On February 1, 1980, a trade agreement between the two countries came into force. Chinese goods received most-favored-nation treatment on the American market, that is, ordinary tariffs instead of prohibitive ones. In the same year, China was admitted to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Moscow had exactly the same agreement. It was signed in October 1972. But Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Under it, a communist country gets ordinary tariffs only if it lets its citizens emigrate freely. A second amendment capped American loans to the Union at 300 million dollars over 4 years and barred loans for developing Soviet oil and gas. Moscow rejected these terms. On January 14, 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announced that the Union had walked away from the agreement.

Five years later, it was China's turn. The law was the same, and China did not let its citizens emigrate freely either. But the amendment has a clause: the president may waive the requirement for an individual country. On October 23, 1979, Jimmy Carter signed such an order for China. It rested on assurances from Chinese officials that emigration would be eased. Senators at the time reproached the White House for treating Beijing and Moscow differently. The Union received the same waiver only in December 1990. Along with it, George Bush gave Moscow up to 1 billion dollars in credit for American food.

The difference between the two communist parties was decided in Washington. The American market was opened to Chinese goods. It was not opened to Soviet goods, and the Union was left to sell oil and gas on the world market for dollars. China became a factory, the Union remained a supplier of raw materials. A factory earns on every new buyer. A raw-material supplier lives as long as the price holds.

Both parties faced the same test, 19 months apart. On the night of June 4, 1989, the Chinese army cleared the center of Beijing of demonstrators by force. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people were killed. George Bush banned high-level contacts with Beijing. In July, his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft secretly flew to Beijing. A year later, Bush renewed China's ordinary tariffs. The House of Representatives tried to tie them to human rights, and Bush promised a veto.

In January 1991, Moscow used force in Vilnius and was left without its loan.

Why was Beijing forgiven what Moscow was not? Moscow sold raw materials the buyer could get from another supplier, and it asked for loans. Beijing did not ask for loans. In 1985, America bought 3.8 billion dollars' worth of Chinese goods. In 1989 it imported 12 billion dollars' worth, in 1992 26 billion. American companies made money on that trade. Punishing Beijing meant punishing them. Punishing Moscow cost Washington nothing.

Hence the answer to Kotkin's second question. Moscow was a viceroy over lands of raw materials. The Chinese Communist Party became the manager of a factory. A viceroy's revenue can be cut: another supplier will sell the raw materials. A manager who keeps the factory running without strikes and free trade unions is not one a buyer wants to replace. That is why the Chinese Communist Party survived: the buyer needed its monopoly on power. The buyer did not need the Soviet party's monopoly. From Moscow it wanted two things: that it keep selling oil and gas, and that it pay back what it had borrowed. That took no communist party. Any government in Moscow could sell raw materials and pay its debts, and after 1991 it did. Kotkin himself notes that the Chinese Communist Party skillfully manipulates American governments and business. And he walks past that fact, as he walks past the rest.

The party survived. Communism did not survive in China either. In 2004, protection of private property was written into the Chinese constitution. Private companies account for about 60% of China's GDP and 80% of urban jobs. All the Chinese Communist Party kept from communism is its name and its monopoly on power.

In Russia and in China alike, the ideology was shackles for the masses. But words alone do not keep the masses obedient. Shackles need bread and force. After 1986, Moscow lacked the money for bread, and the lender forbade the force. That is why in Russia the shackles gave way. In China, the factory feeds people, and no one punished the party for the force it used in 1989. There the shackles are intact.

That leaves the 1920s. Kotkin holds them up as an example, and his Russian reader calls the NEP a model for today's Russia.

What did the NEP look like from the outside? Moscow leased raw materials to foreign capital as concessions. In June 1925, the American Averell Harriman obtained the manganese mines of Chiatura in Georgia. The contract was signed for 22 years. In the same year, the London company Lena Goldfields took a concession on the gold fields of the Lena River, where it had worked before the revolution. Harriman left after 3 years. Most of the other concessions were also closed ahead of time.

They were closed once Moscow no longer needed a tenant. From 1929, it sold grain and raw materials to the West itself and used the hard currency to buy equipment there.

In other words, the NEP was a time when Moscow was looking for someone to lease its resources to for hard currency. "Market socialism" and Lenin's wisdom have nothing to do with it. In both cases that Kotkin cites as successes, the communist party had an outside buyer with hard currency. The Moscow of the 1920s looked for one and found it. Deng got one in 1980. Gorbachev's buyer cut his revenue in half, and his lender set conditions.

Kotkin makes one more observation that works against him. He writes that the Soviet elite accepted the collapse because it turned its control over state property into private ownership and kept power in the republics. And in the same place he notes that half a century later Russia still lives off the same oil and gas revenues.

Put these two observations together. The state disappeared. The party disappeared. The ideology disappeared. The people who controlled the raw materials stayed. The goods stayed. The currency they are paid in stayed.

The hegemon made Moscow pay for the collapse. At first, the Soviet debt was going to be divided among the republics: Russia's share was 61%, Ukraine's 16%. But between March 1992 and March 1993, Moscow signed a so-called "zero option" with 12 republics: all the Union's debt and all its foreign assets passed to Moscow. The creditors were left with a single debtor. And that debtor paid. In 2006, Russia repaid 22 billion dollars of Soviet debt to Western governments. It made the last payment on that debt in August 2017.

Washington did not let this debtor fall. From 1990, under a trade agreement, American chicken leg quarters flowed into the Union; Russians called them "Bush legs". On February 10, 1992, 12 American military transport planes carried food and medicine to the former republics.

If all this survived the collapse of the regime, then communism was not the main thing. The main thing was the post of viceroy. Moscow lost part of its lands but kept its army, its raw materials and its buyer. The post outlived 1991.

Why does Russia refuse to see this? The story of a superpower standing up to America as an equal was useful to both sides. It helped Moscow keep down its own colonies. It allowed Washington never to say out loud what the Union was to it. Kotkin and his Russian reader both follow this same rut. The American looks for the cause of the collapse inside the Communist Party. The Russian looks for a recipe for stability inside the Russian economy.

The Russian author prays to the market. Whose market is it? From 1992 to 2022, Russia's market economy meant selling oil and gas for dollars and euros. Moscow kept its reserves in its buyers' banks and invested them in its buyers' debt. In February 2022, after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, about 300 billion dollars of those reserves were frozen.

The "NEP-2" stands on the same thing the late Soviet Union stood on. On a buyer who pays in its own currency and can stop paying.

Kotkin asked why communism collapsed in the Union and survived in China. It survived in neither, because power in both countries never rested on it. Communism was shackles for the masses, and shackles cost money. The money came from the hegemon. The Chinese party remained useful to it and got its market. In return, it gave up communism itself and kept only power. The hegemon cut the Moscow viceroy's revenue, forbade it to use force and made it pay for the collapse. The shackles fell, the Union fell apart, and Moscow went on paying Soviet debts until 2017.

The post of viceroy has not gone anywhere. Until 2022, Russia sold the same raw materials for the same currency and kept its earnings with the same hegemon. The Russian author calls on everyone to pray to that market and fears ration coupons and army boots, the symbols of a war economy. He should fear something else. In 2022, the viceroy used force without permission, and the hegemon answered as it did in 1991: it cut off the money. In 1991, Moscow's possessions fell away after that. The market the Russian author prays to does not belong to Moscow, and the terms on it are still set by the master.

If you enjoyed this piece, you might also be interested in my books: The Economics of Losses, available in English and in Ukrainian, and The Russian Myth, available in English and in Ukrainian.