Russia: A Parasitic System Under Cover of an Idiotic Myth

Historian, analyst, and independent journalist Oleg Cheslavsky gave an extensive interview to the YouTube channel “Politeka,” where he discussed the nature of Russian mythology, propaganda mechanisms, and the reasons for its remarkable resilience. The conversation took place on the eve of the official presentation of his new book “The Russian Myth,” which recently appeared on Ukrainian book platforms.

Ten Years of Research

Cheslavsky revealed that “The Russian Myth” is actually a byproduct of a more ambitious work. His main project is a trilogy, “Myths of the Third Rome,” where he examines the entire period of Russia’s mythological creation from beginning to present.

“I started collecting materials back in 2014,” the researcher explains. “I became interested: why did Russia invade Crimea? Why are there constant conversations that this is important, necessary, that Russia cannot exist without it?”

After ten years of work, Cheslavsky reached an unexpected conclusion. “Despite all of Moscow’s backwardness, an extremely cynical, cruel system has developed there, covered by an absolutely idiotic myth about the Third Rome,” he says. “Inside is a cynical core, practical, pragmatic, which plunders the colonies. And for the people, a myth has been created. Multi-layered, multi-storied, and it exists for everyone living in Russia.”

Virtual Values Instead of Reality

When asked by host Eduard Glioza what the Russian myth is, Cheslavsky responded that it is simultaneously a political technology, religious doctrine, cultural narrative, and a form of collective self-hypnosis.

“What’s the paradox? When you take something from a person, you need to give something in return,” the historian explains. “The authorities in Russia take away all material things from people and give virtual values. They explain: you must suffer, because you are lucky — you can suffer in Russia, and this is a direct path to the kingdom of God.”

Cheslavsky recalls Putin’s words: “You will all burn, and we will go to paradise.” This idea is deeply rooted in Russian consciousness. Even the expression about the deceased is telling: “He suffered through life,” not lived, but specifically suffered through.

“The idea of eternal eschatology, the expectation of the Last Judgment is more important than today’s life,” the researcher continues. “They have so refused to see the world around them that they literally live in anticipation of the Last Judgment. I used to travel to Russia very often for work and was amazed at how sick people are with this idea. Really sick.”

The Abstraction of Happiness

When the conversation turned to Russians who claim to feel happy, Cheslavsky explained this through the concept of artificially created abstractions.

“The world is an abstraction. Someone forms these abstract representations: the abstraction of normality, the abstraction of the state, the abstraction of happiness,” he says. “From the point of view of those abstractions that Russian TV series, television, books, and propaganda lay down — they have a happy world. They exist in the abstraction of happiness.”

It is extremely difficult to bring people out of this state, the researcher admits. “I went through the constructs, couldn’t understand where there might be a door into this consciousness. When you try to explain logical formulas, a safety switch triggers in them. They simply stop thinking, reasoning, responding. ‘You’re the fool’ — and the dialogue ends.”

Cheslavsky uses a vivid metaphor: “Human life is like a golden visa. You invest your life in the country where you live, ensuring the continuation of your family, providing for your children. Russians invested their lives 300 years ago. Generation after generation they continue to believe that their shares will someday be compensated with money. This doesn’t happen. Most tragically — it doesn’t bother anyone.”

“Russky” Is Not an Ethnonym

One of the most important claims in the interview concerns the nature of the term “Russian people.” Cheslavsky is categorical: this is a political construct, not a natural ethnic phenomenon.

“There was never anything ethnic in the word ‘russky,’” the historian explains. “It was a faith, like ‘Catholic’ or ‘Orthodox.’”

According to his research, when the Moscow prince received the title “of all Rus’” at the end of the 15th century, he did not call himself tsar, king, or emperor. “I came to the conclusion: he was crowned over the church. There is the concept of the Rus’ church — people of the Rus’ canon of the Christian church. That canon, which arose in Rus’ in 988, was Rus’. People in this canon were russky.”

Cheslavsky draws attention to documents from the Time of Troubles, where Poles wrote that it was important for Muscovites that Vladislav preserve the “Rus’ faith” — not Orthodoxy, but specifically the “Rus’ faith.”

Even more interesting is the case with Peter I’s troops. “His generals wrote: ‘These russkies are putting up terrible resistance to us,’” says the researcher. “People who lived in Novgorod, Pskov — lands historically connected with Kyivan Rus’, where co-religionists lived — they were called russky. You can count this historical moment as Muscovites fighting against russkies.”

The term mutated into a national one only with the creation of the empire by Peter I, who became emperor of all russkies — the protector of all Rus’ co-religionists. “But this is rather an anti-national name: there can be Russian Jews, Russian Tajiks — this sounds normal. ‘Russian Russian’ somehow doesn’t sound right,” Cheslavsky notes ironically.

The Church as Political Interface

The historian devoted a large part of the conversation to the role of the church in forming the Russian myth. His conclusions are unexpected.

“The first church canons were economic, not related to religion,” he recounts. “It was about the relationships of traders, rules, dispute resolution. I even have an article ‘The Church Follows the Caravan.’”

The church, being the only institution with literacy among all participants, the ability to keep records and build state policy, became what formed our entire understanding of the world. “The church is urban culture. It really formed the consciousness of countries,” says Cheslavsky. “Much of what we have now — from accounting to writing — appeared thanks to them.”

But in Russia, according to the researcher, the essence of the teaching was distorted. “I read: ‘God did not create death and does not rejoice in the destruction of the living’ — that’s the Old Testament. How after this does the church authority declare: ‘I permit this war, I permit attacking a neighboring country’? This is a complete contradiction. They don’t read the books they defend.”

Divine Election of Power

Russian mythology, according to Cheslavsky, primarily explains injustice through the concept of divine election of power.

“You should not think about why this is happening, why it seems unjust to you. This is not your problem. Divinely chosen power makes decisions,” he explains. “The Russian tsar is a created tsar, equal to God, in human form. Somewhere he is practically the Messiah. It seems unjust to you, but you don’t understand the depth of the plan.”

After this, says the historian, any movement toward protest or resistance stops. “People understand — this is their path, the Russian path. One must endure. It sounds like schizophrenia, but it has become mass, it works — and not only in the Russian Federation.”

History Built on Mythology

When asked about falsifications in history, Cheslavsky answered unequivocally: “If history is built on facts, then Russian history is built on mythology. Ancient mythology is supplemented by new mythology, the next level is built on this. No one remembers where history once was.”

He drew special attention to the “Tale of Bygone Years”: “This is the mycelium of Third Rome mythology. All the constructs were built there, which were then pulled out, distorted, reworked, on which the main ideological model that exists today in Russia was formed.”

According to him, the number of inconsistencies with history in this document is insane. “Practically nothing is proven, but we believe. We erect monuments to Rurik, who could not have existed. The shield on the gates of Tsargrad is nonsense, because there was no Oleg’s campaign to Tsargrad. But there’s also no mention of Askold and Dir’s campaign to Constantinople — not a word.”

Verification Methodology

Cheslavsky shared his method of distinguishing truth from manipulation. “When I claim something, I try to verify it with three or four sources. If I find it only in one — the probability of myth is practically one hundred percent.”

Another indicator is emotional rhetoric. “If emotional rhetoric begins, I understand — a person is trying to remove you from a state of logic,” he says. “Typical Russian rhetoric: ‘Ukrainians never existed, Lenin invented you.’”

The main rule he was given in institute: “Look where the money leads. Want to understand — explain to yourself who was the main beneficiary of events, schemes, interpretations? When you see this, you begin to understand why it happened, who benefited.”

The Antifragility of Myth

When asked why the Russian myth is so resilient — from tsarism to Putin’s regime — Cheslavsky gave an unexpected answer: “Unreality. Like Taleb’s antifragility.”

“If there were a real construction inside — it would break on logic, on the human factor,” he explains. “When a person begins to dismantle, understand that this is a myth, when they cling to reality — the myth breaks. Therefore, the entire construction was carefully built on mythical ideas, mythical facts. It is quite coherent and easily supplemented.”

He recalls Medinsky’s words: “If this history is not reality, we’ll just rewrite it. We need it. We don’t need facts to operate with them.”

By this, according to the historian, the very function of history is destroyed. “The evolution of humanity is a very difficult path of trial and error. European history has learned many lessons.”

Cheslavsky gives an example from Munich, where two monuments stand. “The guide says: ‘These are our two greatest Bavarian representatives. This is a traitor, and this is a coward.’ They know the truth, they’re not ashamed. Would anyone say ‘Ivan the Terrible is a traitor’? No one will say it, even if there are thousands of facts.”

They have clean, open history to avoid repeating past mistakes. “Russia did it differently: turned all past mistakes into feats, essentially drags them into the future, repeats and repeats them.”

Investment in Nothing

Cheslavsky speaks especially emotionally about the senselessness of sacrifices. “The capture of Kyiv — 400 thousand dead. In the Great Patriotic War — 400 thousand. This is schizophrenia. Take any other Russian war — people go to die by the thousands. Is life worthless?”

He poses a rhetorical question: “A normal person says: ‘I’ll consider life from the point of view of investment. I die — my children will live better.’ We look historically: when did this happen? Never. Another Russian goes, dies for another tree line. He knows that tomorrow his children will live worse. Why does he do this? Does he hate his children?”

The answer, says Cheslavsky, is that history tells it the other way around: “We became better, the country became bigger, we got more money. In reality, in the dry residue — nothing. There is religion, conviction that the country is great. Everything virtual. Everything real goes to the main beneficiaries of the country. Everything virtual — to the people. Eat up.”

Is There a Cure?

To the final question of whether this mass psychosis can be cured, Cheslavsky answered restrainedly: “Theoretically — it’s necessary. Practically — it’s hard to imagine, because there is no targeted program in the world.”

“Russians live in a dream factory built by a huge number of TV series, they don’t get out of there,” he says. “Neither the USA nor we have the task of bringing people out of anabiosis.”

The historian is not sure there is a method, but sees this as an evolutionary moment. “We are experiencing a certain evolutionary moment. If humanity can survive this — good. If not — we’ll disappear like the dinosaurs. Now everyone makes a decision every day, forms their future, the future of their children.”

The full version of the interview can be viewed on the “Politeka” YouTube channel. The official presentation of Oleg Cheslavsky’s book “The Russian Myth” will take place soon.

Oleg Cheslavsky is a Ukrainian historian, analyst, and independent journalist, author of numerous studies on the deconstruction of imperial narratives and Russian propaganda.