Sumant Kapur is a British businessman of Indian origin, whose name practically never appears in public registers of arms suppliers, but his role in the shadow logistics of defense technologies is strategic.
He managed to build a network of companies working simultaneously with two warring camps β Russia and Ukraine, engaging in the supply and repair of aviation engines for Soviet MI-17 helicopters, which still form the basis of the Air Force fleet of India and a number of other countries.
Kapur buys engines from one side of the conflict, and repairs and services them from the other. This is possible thanks to a complex scheme of offshore companies, shell companies, former military personnel, and quiet agreements with officials.
π§© Network Architecture: Companies, Intermediaries, Military
The center of Sumant Kapur's operations is not in London, but in Dubai, from where he manages a number of Indian companies connected to Ukrainian defense factories:
| Company | Country | Connection |
|---|---|---|
| Ivchenko Progress India Pvt Ltd | India | Formal representative of Ukrainian SE "Ivchenko-Progress" |
| Zorya Mashproekt India Pvt Ltd | India | Affiliated with Nikolaev enterprise "Zorya-Mashproekt" |
| Aqila Technologies and Integration Solutions Pvt Ltd | India | Control center of the scheme, headed by former Indian Air Force officers |
| ATX Systems | India / UAE | Expansion into drones and communication systems |
All of them are serviced by Kapur's close circle, including:
Rajat Kapoor β director of Ivchenko and Aqila, Sumant's right hand in India.
Pushpanadhan Vellaparambil β "money man" in Dubai, manages finances and settlements.
Arun Sawhney β responsible for the Russian direction, holds a valid visa to RF.
Col Anil Yadav (Retd) and Wing Commander Rakesh Madhra (Retd) β former Indian military personnel involved in negotiations and technology promotion.
πΊπ¦ Ukrainian Track: Technology Export Through "Localization"
Since the beginning of the full-scale war, Ukraine has been actively seeking new markets for its defense industry. Kapur took advantage of this window of opportunity, presenting Ukrainian engines as an alternative to Russian components for the Indian MI-17 fleet.
He personally financed the delivery of two Ivchenko AI-20 engines from Ukraine to India for Air Force testing β bypassing regular tenders. This gave him direct access to key contacts in India's Ministry of Defense.
π·πΊ Russian Trail: Working with the Enemy Under Cover
Despite the ban on entry to Russia (according to sources, introduced in 2023), Kapur continues to receive components and logistical support from RF. Officials who previously received kickbacks and access to supplies from him help him with this.
This explains the preservation of deliveries of individual units for MI-17 from Russia β through Dubai and Indian companies, essentially masking Russian origin under "Ukrainian localization."
π’ Hotel Office and Defense Lobbying
The office of Ivchenko Progress India is officially registered in Le Meridien Commercial Tower, New Delhi, but Kapur's real base is in the UAE. This allows:
- avoiding Western export restrictions,
- conducting payments through alternative channels,
- working with dual-use goods without licenses.
During Narendra Modi's visit to Ukraine, Kapur, accompanied by Ajay Rathore and Ashutosh Lal, arranged a presentation of Ukrainian engines as an "innovative response" to India's needs. This was a diplomatic staging β not without participation from the Ukrainian side.
β οΈ Risks for Ukraine
Although Ukraine receives currency and new contracts, this scheme is not harmless:
Violation of export legislation β engines can be used in countries close to RF.
Reputational risks β Ukraine can be drawn into machinations with Russian units.
Lack of control β the supply chain is managed by a private intermediary, not accountable to any ministry.
β What is Hidden Behind the Scheme: "Make in India" or "Mask from India"?
The Government of India declares a course toward import substitution, but Kapur, acting on behalf of Ukrainian companies, essentially creates a new dependence β only not on Russia, but on non-transparent private suppliers with foreign technologies.
And instead of formal import, Ukraine supplies "localized" technologies, without controlling who and how uses them.
π Conclusions:
Sumant Kapur created a unique infrastructure for bypassing war β and sanctions β with the help of two armies, three countries, and dozens of companies.
His model is not business, but a hybrid scheme for manipulating conflict in the interests of supplies.
Ukraine urgently needs to conduct an audit of such contracts β otherwise it risks becoming a bridge not to peace, but to a corrupt international arms black market.
