Russia as a Dying Empire: From Tuzla to Crimea and War as a Means of Plunder

Instead of pursuing modernization and diversification of production, the Kremlin has reproduced an archaic model of resource dependence, where control over raw materials serves as the foundation of power. By 2008, the economic and political deadlock had become apparent — and from that moment, war began to be used as a tool of internal stabilization and external blackmail.

The Economy of a Resource Appendage and the Limits of Growth

According to HSE data (2020), between 1998–2008, Russia increased its share in global GDP (by PPP) from 3.0% to 4.0%. However, from 2008 to 2018, this share declined to 3.1%. This indicates that despite high oil prices and a steady influx of currency, the country failed to convert revenues into long-term development. Key reasons:

• lack of investment in processing and science;
• a corrupt vertical power structure;
• dependence on energy export markets.

The result was Russia’s transformation into a resource appendage, a supplier of hydrocarbons and metals, incapable of technological autonomy.

A Political System in Crisis: The 2008 Moment

The pseudo-transfer of power from Putin to Medvedev in 2008 demonstrated that the Kremlin was not prepared for liberalization or elite renewal. At the same time, economic growth slowed, household incomes stagnated, and the system began to burn out from within. The need for “national mobilization” required an external enemy and a pretext for conflict.

The General Rehearsal: Tuzla (2003)

The conflict over Tuzla — a little-known but revealing episode. Moscow tried to establish control over the Kerch Strait using “environmental” and “infrastructure” pretexts. This crisis:

• tested Ukraine’s and the West’s response to provocation;
• rehearsed the mechanism of hybrid aggression;
• enabled the buildup of military and informational infrastructure in Crimea.

It became the first tactical maneuver of the new imperial policy.

Georgia (2008): The First Stage of Revenge

The war with Georgia was the first overt projection of force beyond Russia’s borders. It was:

• a demonstration of readiness to violate sovereignty;
• a test of the international response to aggression;
• a distraction from internal stagnation.

Notably, the war began during the global financial crisis, which allowed the Kremlin to further tighten domestic control and freeze any reformist momentum.

Crimea (2014): The Reboot of the Imperial Matrix

The annexation of Crimea became the ideological culmination of the course toward external expansion as a form of internal stabilization. It brought:

• short-term euphoria and a spike in approval ratings;
• sanctions that deepened isolation and mobilization;
• a new wave of militarization and repression.

Crimea was not the restoration of historical justice, but the beginning of a new cycle of resource redistribution under authoritarian stagnation.

Ukraine (2022): War as a Logic of the System

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine was the logical continuation and culmination of all previous stages. War serves multiple functions:

• channels protest sentiments;
• legitimizes repression and looting;
• allows the Kremlin to redistribute income and resources in favor of security and bureaucratic elites.

Russia is not a modernizing state, but a dying empire clinging to power through expansion and plunder. The weaker its position in the outside world, the more violently it strangles its own colonies — from Siberia to the national republics.

Conclusion

For Russia, war is not a means to an end — it is a mode of existence. It has become an instrument of looting, consolidating power, and maintaining a degrading vertical of control. The events from Tuzla to Ukraine show: the crisis is not temporary, but systemic. And every new spiral of violence is a desperate attempt to conceal internal emptiness behind the smoke of imperial revenge.